

Information disorders during the COVID-19 infodemic: The case of Italian Facebook

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ABSTRACT

The recent COVID-19 pandemic came alongside with an “infodemic”, with online social media flooded by often unreliable information associating the medical emergency with popular subjects of disinformation. In Italy, one of the first European countries suffering a rise in new cases and dealing with a total lockdown, controversial topics such as migrant flows and the 5G technology were often associated online with the origin and diffusion of the virus. In this work we analyze COVID-19 related conversations on the Italian Facebook, collecting over 1.5M posts shared by nearly 80k public pages and groups for a period of four months since January 2020. On the one hand, our findings suggest that well-known unreliable sources had a limited exposure, and that discussions over controversial topics did not spark a comparable engagement with respect to institutional and scientific communication. On the other hand, however, we realize that dis- and counter-information induced a polarization of (clusters of) groups and pages, wherein conversations were characterized by a topical lexicon, by a great diffusion of user generated content, and by link-sharing patterns that seem ascribable to coordinated propaganda. As revealed by the URL-sharing diffusion network showing a “small-world” effect, users were easily exposed to harmful propaganda as well as to verified information on the virus, exalting the role of public figures and mainstream media, as well as of Facebook groups, in shaping the public opinion.

1. Introduction and related work

The spread of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) in the past months has changed in an unprecedented way the everyday life of people on a global scale. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), at the time of this writing the pandemic has caused over 23M confirmed cases, with more than 809k fatalities globally speaking.¹ Italy, in particular, has been one of the first European countries to be severely hit by the pandemic, as the virus spread outside China borders at the end of January, and to implement national lockdown on the 8th of March [1,2]. Following Italy and China, national lockdowns have been adopted by most countries around the world, drastically reducing mobility flows in order to circumvent the spread [3].

In relation to the emergency, the term “infodemic” has been coined to describe the risks related to the massive spread of harmful and malicious content on online social platforms [4], as misinformation could support the spread of the virus undermining medical efforts and, at the same time, drive societal mistrust producing other direct damages [4]. In response, several contemporary works have provided different perspectives on this phenomenon. Authors of [5] analyzed

more than 100 millions Twitter messages posted worldwide in 64 languages and found correspondence between waves of unreliable and low-quality information and the epidemic ones. Authors of [6] have investigated the prevalence of low-credibility content in relation to the activity of social bots, showing that the combined amount of unreliable information is comparable to the retweets of articles published on The New York Times alone. Finally, authors of [7] have carried out a comparative analysis of information diffusion on different social platforms, from Twitter to Reddit, finding different volumes of misinformation in different environments.

As a matter of fact, ever since 2016 US presidential elections we observed a growing concern of the research community over deceptive information spreading on online social networks [8–11]. In Italy, according to Reuters, trust in news is particularly low today [12], and previous research has highlighted the exposure to online disinformation in several political circumstances, from 2016 Constitutional Referendum to 2019 European Parliament elections [13–17]. A recent questionnaire by the EU funded SOMA observatory on disinformation spreading on online social media² showed that people relied on official

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¹ <https://covid19.who.int>.

² <http://www.t-6.it/report-on-the-role-of-the-information-in-the-emergency-covid-19-impacts-and-consequences-on-people-behaviors-report/>.

channels used by authoritative institutions in order to inform about the pandemic. Interestingly, social media were not the primary source of information during the crisis.

Similar to contemporary research, in this work we adopt a consolidated strategy to label news articles at the source level [10,18–21] and investigate accordingly the diffusion of different kinds of information on Facebook. Thus, we use the term “disinformation” as a shorthand for unreliable information in several forms, all potentially harmful, including false news, click-bait, propaganda, conspiracy theories and unverified rumours. We use instead the term “mainstream” to indicate traditional news websites which convey reliable and accurate information. This approach has been mainly used for Twitter, which however exhibits a declining trend as a platform to consume online news [12,17]. Similar to [22], we leverage Crowdtangle platform to collect posts related to COVID-19 from Facebook public pages and groups. We use a set of keywords related to the epidemic and we limit the search to posts in the Italian language. The overall dataset accounts for over 1.5M public posts shared by almost 80k unique pages/groups. We investigate the prevalence of reliable vs non-reliable information by analyzing the domain of URLs included in such posts. In particular, we are interested in understanding how specific disinformation narratives compete with official communications. To this aim, we further specify keywords related to three different controversial topics that have been trending in the past few months, all related to the origins of the novel coronavirus: (1) the alleged correlation between COVID-19 and migrants, (2) between the virus and 5G technology, and (3) rumours about the artificial origin of the virus.

This work provides the following main contributions:

- We evaluate the prevalence of COVID-19 and related controversial topics on the Italian Facebook, identifying the key players and the most relevant pieces of content in the information ecosystem in terms of both volume of posts and generated engagement.
- We study how these issues shaped the debate on Facebook, quantifying the sentiment of posts, the polarization of groups and pages w.r.t. topics of discussion and measuring the respective lexical/semantic divergence.
- We analyze patterns in the URL sharing network of groups/pages, observing that the majority of Facebook groups and pages interact in a “small-world” – thus discarding the hypothesis that different groups draw upon fully separated pools of web resources.
- We focus on the connections among URLs related to controversial topics and among groups/pages where these URLs were shared, to find evidence of a coordinated effort to spread propaganda and to ascertain that centrality in these networks is not directly correlated with high engagement.

The outline of this paper is the following: we first describe the methodology applied, including the collection of data from Facebook, the taxonomy of news sources and controversial topics, and both text and network analysis tools (Section 2); then we describe our contributions (Sections 3 and 4), and finally we draw conclusions and future work (Section 5).

2. Methodology

2.1. Facebook data collection

We used CrowdTangle’s “historical data” interface [23] to fetch posts in Italian language shared by public pages and groups since January 1st 2020 until May 12th 2020 and containing any of the following keywords: *virus*, *coronavirus*, *covid*, *sars-cov-2*, *sars cov 2*, *pandemia*, *epidemia*, *pandemic*, *epidemic*. The tool only tracks public posts made by public accounts or groups. Besides, it does not track every

public account³ and does not track neither private profiles nor private groups. For each post we collected the number of public interactions, namely, likes, reactions, comments, shares, upvotes and three second views, as well as Uniform Resource Locators (URL) attached with it. Our collection contains overall 1.59M posts shared by 87,426 unique Facebook pages/groups. In the rest of the paper, we use “accounts” as a shorthand to indicate the entire set of pages and groups. Data is not publicly available, but it can be provided to academics and non-profit organizations upon request to the platform.

2.2. Mainstream and disinformation news

Similarly to [5–7], we aim to understand the prevalence of reliable vs non-reliable information based on lists of news outlets compiled from multiple sources and employed in a previous analysis of the Italian information ecosystem [17,21]. We use a coarse “source-based” approach, widely adopted in the literature [10,18–20], to label links shared in Facebook posts that point to online news articles in two classes according to their domain: (i) *Disinformation* sources, which notably publish a variety of harmful information, from hyper-partisan stories to false news and conspiracy theories; (ii) *Mainstream* sources, which may be assumed to generally provide accurate and reliable news reporting. Indeed, this classification might not always hold since unreliable websites do share also true news, and incorrect news coverage on traditional outlets is not rare [9]; however, it has been proven effective to analyze content shared during the 2016 US Presidential elections [10,18,19]. For what concerns unreliable news, we further partition the class into four distinct sets according to the geographic area: European (EU), Italian (IT), Russian (RU) and US sources. The overall list, available in the Appendix, Tables A.1–A.5, contains 25 Italian sources for the Mainstream domain whereas, for the disinformation domain, we count 25 EU sources, 52 Italian sources, 13 Russian sources and 22 US sources.

2.3. Controversial topics

In our analysis, we focus on three specific topics which were particularly exposed to disinformation during the infodemic⁴:

- **MIGRANTS**: conspiracy theories that attempt to correlate the spread of the virus with migration flows. These are mainly promoted by far-right communities to foster racial hate. Some of the related keywords are: *migranti*, *immigrati*, *ong*, *barconi*, *extracomunitari*, *africa*.
- **LABS**: rumours that have been used as political weapons to attribute the origins of the pandemic to the development of a bioweapon to be used by China and/or to undermine the forthcoming U.S. presidential elections. Some of the related keywords are: *laboratorio*, *ricerca*, *sperimentazione*.
- **5G**: hoaxes that can be summarized in two main streams, those claiming that 5G activates COVID-19 and those that deny the existence of the novel coronavirus and attribute its symptoms to reactions to 5G waves. Both lines are obviously false and not supported by scientific evidence. Some of the related keywords are: *5g*, *onde*, *radiazioni*, *elettromagnetismo*.

A complete list of keywords for each topic is available in the Appendix. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to an account as a “MIGRANTS” account – and likewise for the other topics – if the account shared at least $N = 2$ posts (to reduce noise) which contain a keyword in the related list; the same holds for URLs if the associated post contained

³ All pages with at least 100 K likes are fully retained. For details on the coverage for pages with less likes we refer the reader to <https://help.crowdtangle.com/en/articles/1140930-what-is-crowdtangle-tracking>.

⁴ <https://www.newsguardtech.com/covid-19-myths/>.




Fig. 1. (Left) Time series of the daily number of posts, total and per topic. (Right) Total engagement generated by news articles for Mainstream (orange), Disinformation domains (green) and both (blue), for each topic and altogether. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

a keyword matching the related topic. Finally, we will denote any account or URL as “controversial” if it is related to at least one of the three topics. In Table 1 we show a breakdown of the dataset in terms of posts and accounts. Note that the number of accounts is lower due to a preprocessing step described in the following paragraph.

2.4. Text analysis

We clean and pre-process posts’ textual content as follows, relying on the *spaCy* [24] and *nlk* [25] Python libraries. Firstly, we lowercase all strings and we remove URLs, punctuation, emojis and Italian stop words. We also remove words related to the COVID-19 as they act as stop word for our analysis. Then, we tokenize texts and we remove tokens shorter than 4 or longer than 20 characters.

Then, we group tokens by account. To reduce noise effects we remove accounts with only 1 post and accounts with less than 20 tokens in total, obtaining 56,436 accounts from an original amount of 87,426. We compute the Tf-Idf of the cleaned strings, neglecting tokens that appeared less than 5 times in the whole corpus. Finally, for each account we obtain a sparse 137,901-dimensional embedding vector.

2.5. Network analysis

We leverage tools from network science [26,27] in order to investigate the diffusion network of content shared on Facebook. Similar to [22], we use a bipartite graph formulation to link together accounts and URLs. Precisely, we draw an undirected edge between an account a and an URL u if and only if u was shared at least once on/by a . This graph has 983,582 vertices (78,760 accounts and 904,822 URLs) and 1,374,921 edges. We then focus on the controversial bipartite graph defined as the subgraph of the accounts-URLs graph induced by controversial URLs. This subgraph has 55,411 vertices (18,681 accounts and 36,730 URLs) and 81,707 edges. Finally, we consider the graphs of controversial URLs and controversial accounts obtained by projecting the giant component of the aforementioned controversial bipartite graph upon the two layers of URLs and accounts, respectively. We first implement two naive projections, wherein having one common neighbor in the bipartite graph is sufficient for being connected in the projected graph. We then focus on two statistically validated projections, relying on the Bipartite Configuration Model (BiCM)⁵ introduced in [28]. In short, the expected adjacency matrix of the BiCM is used to identify statistically significant patterns of common neighbors in the original bipartite graph. This means that two URLs u_1 and u_2 (resp., two

accounts a_1 and a_2) are connected if the number of accounts that shared both (resp., of URLs shared by both) is too large to be just explained by the degree distribution of the two layers.

3. Descriptive statistics

3.1. Posts, interactions and news articles

We first inspect the prevalence of COVID-19 in online conversations by looking at the time series of daily posts on Facebook, reported in the left panel of Fig. 1 for both the whole dataset (bottom) and the three controversial topics (top). We observe a general increase in the overall volume, with a few notable spikes: at the end of January, when China imposed the lockdown; at the end of February, when the virus was first diagnosed in Italy; at mid March, when the lockdown was applied in Italy; at the beginning of May, when the restrictions have been lifted. For what concerns controversial topics, we immediately see that the volumes are negligible w.r.t general conversations and that the trends are quite aligned. Yet, a few topic specific spikes can be observed, which are most likely related to real world events such as the sabotages of 5G antennas in several countries. In the Appendix, Fig. A.1, we provide the time series of the daily engagement, which is by all means analogous to the volume of posts, although with a different order of magnitude — the total daily engagement reaches 10^{19} , while the engagement of controversial topics is consistently smaller by 2 orders of magnitude.

For what concerns the diffusion of URLs, we inspect most popular domains by focusing on their total engagement. In particular, in the Top-10 ranking of domains we encounter websites which are all related to Italian Mainstream newspapers, with the exception of Facebook and YouTube which are the 2 most shared domains. When we focus on the Top-10 ranking of news websites, we observe what follows (see also Fig. A.2 in the Appendix):

- Italian Mainstream newspapers generated from 2 to 6M interactions;
- IT disinformation outlets generated no more than 500k interactions each; The top-3 are a generic untrustworthy website (“*silenziefalsita.it*”), the far-right website (“*ilprimatonazionale.it*”) and a law enforcement fan club (“*sostenitori.it*”)
- only one RU website “*it.sputniknews.com*”, which is technically in Italian language but notably associated to a Russian press agency, generated more than 100k interactions, whereas the others had a negligible engagement;
- EU and US sources did not receive much attention, rarely exceeding 3k interactions.

⁵ <https://github.com/tsakim/bicm>.

Table 1

Number of posts and accounts (i.e., both groups and pages) for each controversial topic, and altogether.

	5G	LABS	MIGRANTS	Intersection	Union	Total
Posts	10937 (0.7%)	25695 (1.6%)	38486 (2.4%)	39 (0.024%)	72440 (4.6%)	1588536
Accounts	5493 (9.7%)	7076 (12.5%)	11238 (19.9%)	1958 (3.5%)	15865 (28.8%)	56436
Groups' Posts	5817	15278	21135	31	40175	715104
Groups	3194	4129	6571	1232	9007	28721
Pages' Posts	5120	10417	17351	8	873432	873432
Pages	2299	2947	4667	726	6858	27715




Fig. 2. Scatter plot of the number of members vs. number of posts (left) and number of interactions (center) for each account. Points are grouped in 100 bins to ease the visualization. (Right) Boxplot of the distribution of relative changes in the number of members/followers for all accounts, for different groups (outliers are filtered).

Similar considerations hold also when analyzing the ranking by number of posts. Overall, as shown in Fig. 1 (right), unreliable sources had a limited yet not negligible amount of engagement (1.5M) compared to news websites which convey reliable information (35.9M), in accordance with contemporary analyses [5–7]. Finally it is interesting to notice that Disinformation sources generate relatively more engagement for the LABS topic, while the MIGRANTS topic was the most discussed among Mainstream news websites.

3.2. Accounts' characteristics

For what concerns metrics for accounts⁶ involved in the analysis, such as the total engagement, total number of posts, number of members and total number of shared links, we report that in all cases their distribution approximately follows power laws, which are common in social networks dimensions [27,29] (see the Appendix, Fig. A.3). When considering separately accounts who discussed on controversial topics, we observe on average a higher activity compared to the global set of accounts, but we do notice similar distributions of members; therefore, we analyze the distribution of members versus the other dimensions (see Fig. 2, left and center) and we notice that (1), as expected, accounts with a larger number of members are more active but also (2) they were more likely involved in discussions on controversial topics. These results do not change if we consider Groups or Pages alone. We also consider the relative change in the number of members/likes of accounts during the observation period. We observe that groups have larger oscillations and higher positive growths compared to pages (see the Appendix, Fig. A.4); also, we notice that accounts which discussed about controversial topics experienced a larger growth compared both to the entire set and to those which did not discuss about any of them (see Fig. 2, right). However, further investigation is needed to understand whether there is a causality effect between discussing about specific topics and experiencing a growth in followers/members.

We then analyzed the total engagement generated by different accounts to understand which were the most influential in general and for each topic. In the former case in the Top-10 ranking (see the Appendix, Table A.6) we encounter 5 pages related to newspapers, 1 to a popular pseudo-journalistic TV program (“Le Iene”) and 4 pages




Fig. 3. Histogram of the polarization scores of accounts.

related to right-wing politicians, including 2 pages entitled to Matteo Salvini and 1 page entitled to Luca Zaia, governor of Veneto, one of the regions most affected by the virus. Each of these accounts generated 13 to 50 M interactions during the period of observation.

For what concerns controversial topics, we consider the Top-10 ranking according to the total number of interactions generated only by posts related to each topic (see the Appendix, Tables A.7–A.9). For what concerns 5G, we notice that most influential accounts shared only 2 to 6 related posts, but they generated 90 K to almost 2M interactions, which were accounted by 2 posts of the Italian Health Ministry. For what concerns LABS, we notice a larger number of posts and total interactions generated, most of which are accounted by Matteo Salvini, leader of the right-wing Lega party. Finally, for what concerns MIGRANTS we see a larger number of posts/interactions w.r.t to other topics, most of which are accounted by a newspaper (“Tgcom24”) and Matteo Salvini, respectively with 3.4M and 1.1M total engagement.

3.3. Polarization of accounts

To investigate the polarization [30] of accounts towards different topics we introduce a polarization score ρ defined as:

$$\rho = \frac{p_a - p_b}{p_a + p_b}$$

where p_b and p_a are, respectively, the number of controversial and non-controversial posts of the considered account. We define a *controversial post* any post that contains at least one of the manually selected tokens (see the Appendix). The polarization index is constrained between -1 ,

⁶ We filtered out accounts with only 1 post to remove noise.




Fig. 4. Normalized histogram of polarization index of accounts, by couples of topics.




Fig. 5. Distribution of the first two main components of embeddings of accounts.

when all the posts of an account are about controversial topics ($p_a = 0$) and $+1$, when no posts involved controversial topics ($p_b = 0$).

Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the polarization scores of accounts. We notice a trimodal distribution: the main peak is at $\rho = 1$, it represents the majority of accounts not talking about controversial topics at all; a second peak occurs at $\rho = 0$, it includes all accounts equally discussing controversial and non-controversial topics; the third and lower peak is at $\rho = -1$, it represents those accounts posting only about controversial topics.

In Fig. 4 we also show how accounts are polarized when comparing topics against each other with the same rationale, *i.e.*, by defining p_a the number of posts about one controversial topic (*e.g.*, 5G) and p_b the number of posts about a different controversial topic (*e.g.*, LABS). Peaks at $\rho = +1$ and $\rho = -1$ indicate that most accounts usually do not talk about more than one controversial topic.

3.4. Linguistic analysis

In Fig. 5 we show a kernel density plot for the embedding of accounts obtained as previously described in Section 2.4. For visualization purposes, we select the first two PCA components. Red indicates controversial accounts, *i.e.*, accounts that published at least two posts about controversial topics, whereas blue indicates the remaining ones. Note that, even if the intersection of controversial accounts is negligible (see Table 1) and the accounts are usually polarized on a single controversial topic (see Fig. 4), the embeddings of the two “classes” have similar distributions. This result suggests that controversial themes are characterized by a common lexicon, distinct from the remainder of the dataset. The aforementioned embeddings might also be suitable input feature vectors for the definition of a finer classifier able to tell apart controversial posts and accounts not relying on predefined lists of keywords and/or news sources. The definition of a similar classifier is however beyond the scope of this paper and is left to future work.

3.5. Sentiment analysis

We compute sentiments of posts using Neuruly’s “Bert-italian-cased-sentiment” model⁷ hosted by Huggingface [31]. It is a BERT base model [32] trained from an instance of “bert-base-italian-cased”⁸ and fine-tuned on an Italian dataset of 45 K tweets on a 3-classes sentiment analysis task (negative, neutral and positive) [33] obtaining 82% test accuracy. Previous work showed that text length can affect the classification accuracy of pre-trained models [34]. The model used in this paper, however, performs extremely well also for texts of variable length and, albeit the model was trained using short texts (*i.e.*, tweets), it seems to benefit from the use of the entire available text (see Fig. A.5 in the Appendix). As a consequence, the sentiment analysis is obtained truncating the texts at 1960 characters – a value identified experimentally as the optimal trade-off between efficiency and accuracy, since using longer texts does not provide any measurable classification gain.

In Fig. 6 we show how the general sentiment of posts evolves during the selected months by plotting the percentage of positive and negative posts weighted by the number of shares. We remark that, even if not shown in the figure, the great part of posts is classified as neutral (81.5%). This value decreases to 78.8% when the posts are weighted by their number of shares. Positive and negative peaks can be mapped to news and events, *e.g.* the two main peaks of negative sentiment, occurring on January 24 and February 10, match with the first confirmed COVID-19 cases in Europe and the first confirmed 1000 deaths worldwide, while the two main peaks of positive sentiment, occurring on February 2 and March 12, correspond to the successful isolation of the virus in the “L. Spallanzani” National Institute for Infectious Diseases and the diffusion of the #andràtuttobene (“it’ll all work out”) hashtag and slogan (see Fig. A.6 in the Appendix).

⁷ <https://huggingface.co/neuruly/bert-base-italian-cased-sentiment>.

⁸ <https://huggingface.co/dbmdz/bert-base-italian-cased>.




Fig. 6. 7-days rolling average of the percentage of posts classified as positive or negative, weighted by the number of shares.




Fig. 7. Percentage of reached URLs when visiting accounts in decreasing order of degree centrality.

4. Sharing diffusion network

To better understand the patterns of sharing diffusion on Facebook, we now focus on the bipartite graph of accounts and URLs and on its projection upon the two layers, as defined in Section 2.5. Since we are particularly interested in characterizing controversial URLs and accounts, we will focus on the subgraph induced by such URLs.

4.1. Bipartite graph

By inspecting the bipartite graph we aim to investigate two related aspects of the COVID-19 infodemic on Facebook: (i) whether there are niches of accounts where possibly extreme conspiracy theories get diffused; and, conversely, (ii) whether there exists a relatively small set of accounts that, altogether, provide access to a vast majority of all available web resources.

To answer question (i), we look at the connected components of the graph. The giant component of the entire bipartite graph includes $\approx 57\%$ of all accounts, $\approx 88\%$ of all URLs and $\approx 92\%$ of all edges. With a bit of simplification, this means that, limited to our dataset, more than half of all Facebook accounts draw upon a unique large pool of web content. Quite interestingly, a similar scenario emerges if we only consider the set of controversial URLs: this bipartite subgraph has 55,411 vertices (18,681 accounts and 36,730 URLs) and 81,707 edges, and its giant component includes $\approx 72\%$ of both accounts and URLs and $\approx 87\%$ of all edges. Components other than the giant are at least two orders of magnitude smaller in both graphs.

The isolation of specific accounts and URLs into such small components seems to emerge as a consequence of marketing strategies. For both graphs, in fact, the majority of the components consist of a small number of accounts – often, just one – sharing many different URLs (see Fig. A.7 in the Appendix). Through manual investigation, we verified that such phenomenon is oftentimes caused by a website controlling one or more Facebook pages to promote its articles. A notable case is “[howtodofor.com](#)”, which seems to use as many as 17 different accounts, none of which is apparently ascribable to the website owners. However, a deeper and more rigorous analysis of similar cases is left to future work.

To answer question (ii), we observe that few accounts are sufficient to reach the majority of the URLs shared in the network, as shown in Fig. 7. To reach 25% of the URLs we need 88 (0.65%) accounts, to

reach 50% of the URLs we need 458 (3.42%) accounts, to reach 75% of the URLs we need 1,535 (11.48%) accounts, finally to reach 90% of the URLs we need 3,539 (26.48%) accounts.

4.2. Controversial URLs, domains and accounts

In this section, we consider the projection of the controversial bipartite graph upon the two layers of URLs and accounts. A naive projection leads to a URL graph with 26,705 vertices and 1,096,672 edges, and to an account graph with 13,363 vertices and 986,509 edges. This projection is useful to analyze a few macroscopic structural properties of the graph. In particular, the diameter, radius and average path length of the two graphs – 10, 5 and 3.24 for URLs, 10, 5 and 2.86 for accounts – depict a *small world* [26,27], or even *ultra-small world*⁹, further confirmed by the global efficiency – 0.33 for URLs, 0.37 for accounts – and the clustering coefficient – 0.38 for URLs, 0.68 for accounts. This means that we observe Facebook accounts which often share common sets of URLs. At the same time, visiting a small percentage of them is enough to cover all the URLs shared in the network, as showed in Fig. 7. Altogether, this suggests that if Facebook allowed users to “jump” through groups and pages via shared URLs, they would likely get to all controversial URLs no matter the stance towards the topic. On the one hand, finding propaganda items on Facebook appears an easy task; on the other hand, debunking articles are probably equally easy to find, if the right instruments for browsing content were provided.

In line with the related literature [35], we now focus on the statistically relevant edges of the two partitions, *i.e.*, those edges that do not just occur as a consequence of the level of activity of groups and pages and of the “virality” of individual news pieces. To make the computation affordable, we first lighten the bipartite graph by pruning all peripheral vertices having degree less than 10, namely, all URLs shared by less than 10 different accounts and all accounts that shared less than 10 different URLs. We then apply the validation process described in details in [28] and summarized in Section 2.5. This process greatly reduces the size and density of the two projections, leading to a URL graph with 442 vertices and 944 edges, and an account graph with 341 vertices and 689 edges.¹⁰ As expected, these validated networks are also highly clustered: we computed modularity-based clusters relying on the well-known Louvain algorithm [36], obtaining two partitions with modularity ≈ 0.86 for URLs and ≈ 0.93 for accounts. We especially aim to leverage on our classification of web domains (*cf.* Section 2.2) and of posts and accounts (*cf.* Section 2.3) to characterize these clusters. As a side result, we expect to gain insights into the possibility to infer the quality of web content solely based on where and who shared a news item.

First, in Fig. 8 we compare the ratio of Mainstream URLs with the ratio of Disinformation URLs present in each cluster, and in the entire validated URL and account graphs. We see that the ratio of deceptive URLs is very low for almost all clusters, and that in general news-related URLs are a minority. One of the reasons is the great diffusion of user generated content, made available through specific web platforms, such as Facebook itself or Youtube, that, by definition, cannot be classified as Disinformation even though they often host unreliable information. “[facebook.com](#)” and “[youtube.com](#)” account for, respectively, $\approx 48\%$ and $\approx 4\%$ of all URLs in our dataset.

Focusing on clusters of URLs, there are only 5 clusters having a positive, greater than the average, prevalence of Disinformation. It is especially noteworthy that one of these clusters is the giant cluster of the graph (67 URLs, 131 edges) and that it also contains several

⁹ A ultra-small world has $L \propto \log \log N$, where L is the average path length and N is the number of nodes.


¹⁰ We used a significance level of 0.05, but we also tested 0.01 obtaining similar results

Table 2
Top 10 URLs by PageRank.


Label	Pagerank	Disinfo categories
fattieavvenimenti.it/migranti-coronavirus-154...	0.00684	mig
nextquotidiano.it/libero-esulta-per-il-coronav...	0.00633	5g
youtube.com/watch?v=UT7fK4sACTw	0.00607	lab
facebook.com/danilotoninelli.m5s/photos/a.3947...	0.00571	mig
gayburg.com/2020/02/lordine-de-giornalisti-aus...	0.00565	5g, mig
facebook.com/salviniofficial/videos/8199186318...	0.00549	mig
quotidiano.net/cronaca/coronavirus-animali-can...	0.00528	lab
ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/i-porti-italiani-r...	0.00519	mig
facebook.com/nicola.morra.63/videos/5294019877...	0.00518	5g
facebook.com/LuigiDiMaio/videos/270379510622815	0.00517	5g

Table 3
Top 10 accounts by PageRank.

Label	Pagerank	5g%	lab%	mig%
Governo Conte - M5S - Luigi Di Maio - Di Battista	0.00839	1.97	4.98	3.93
Gruppo sostenitori di Vox Italia	0.00686	3.77	14.63	5.54
Gruppo Tutto TRAVAGLIO Forever	0.00619	1.95	4.71	5.35
Amici di Diego Fusaro	0.00602	4.05	10.81	4.05
MATTEO SALVINI, E GIORGIA MELONI PER UN'ITALIA SICURA E STABILE!	0.00555	1.02	4.1	19.28
DOTT. ANTONIETTA MORENA GATTI E DOTT. STEFANO MONTANARI PATRIMONIO DELL'UMA	0.00546	7.87	15.75	1.57
Vaccini Puliti. Rimozione dal commercio dei prodotti vaccinali contaminati	0.00532	3.86	16.02	3.37
Fan di Vox Italia - Diego Fusaro	0.00496	5.1	10.97	8.93
Parliamone con... Paolo Barnard	0.00496	8.33	19.44	8.33
Salvini premier la rivoluzione del buonsenso idee cuore e coraggio	0.00496	1.6	7.19	14.78



(a) URL clusters



(b) Account clusters

Fig. 8. Prevalence of Mainstream and Disinformation domains in different clusters of the validated URL graph and account graph. The marker size is proportional to the cluster size.

Mainstream URLs, most of which belong to either “ilgiornale.it” or

“liberoquotidiano.it”, two outlets notably close to the Italian sovereign right parties. This hints to the fact that successful propaganda builds on the support of well-known and accredited media. The two clusters of URLs with the greatest ratio of Disinformation are instead very small clusters (6 URLs) with a single known Disinformation URL. However, the other 5 URLs of one of these two clusters all belong to the same domain, “oasisana.com”, which, after manual inspection, resulted being a “free and natural information” website, mostly focused on anti-5G propaganda. This finding speaks in favor of the possibility to use source-based labeling and network-based clustering combined to identify other previously unknown Disinformation domains.

For what regards accounts, the clusters with a significant share of Disinformation URLs are composed of a few groups and pages that cooperate to diffuse news pieces produced by a well-defined and small set of domains. Especially remarkable are:

- A set of 6 accounts with nationalism-referring names that share content from “tg24-ore.com”, “curiosity-online.com” and “howtodofor.com”.
- Two pages close to the “Lega Nord” (“Lega - Salvini Premier News” and “Notizie Lega Nord”), mostly brought together by the diffusion of hundreds of news pieces from “ilfattoquotidiano.it” and “ilgiornale.it”. Quite interestingly, the most diffused domain by the page “Notizie Lega Nord” is “it.sputniknews.com”, with almost 2 K URLs shared, which is the Italian version of the well-known Russian propaganda agency Sputnik.
- A cluster of 8 anti-5G groups and pages linked together by URLs from the aforementioned “oasisana.com” and all contributing to the diffusion of conspiracy theories through videos shared on Youtube or directly on Facebook.
- A cluster of 15 fan groups of sovereign right leaders Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni that, within a mix of news from Disinformation and Mainstream media, re-share video produced by the two leaders themselves on Facebook.




Fig. 9. Prevalence of controversial topics in different clusters of the validated URL graph and account graph. The line width is proportional to the cluster size.

These findings suggest that propaganda upon controversial topics is driven by well-defined ideological affiliation, and that a few political parties, their leaders and their supporting Mainstream media have a precise role in shaping the public opinion. It also shows, however, that anti-scientific propaganda is apparently cross-ideological.

To further characterize the obtained clusters, in Fig. 9 we show the prevalence of each of the three controversial topics in each of the clusters, compared to the whole graph. Precisely, for each cluster of URLs we compute the ratio of such URLs that fall in each category, whereas for accounts we compute this ratio for each account and then, for each cluster, we average over the accounts of that cluster. We see that the larger clusters (marked with a thicker line) are generally balanced, with one main exception, for both URLs and accounts, of a large cluster entirely focused on the “MIGRANTS”. We also see that smaller *topical* clusters exist for all categories. By manual inspection, we verified that these clusters are composed of groups and pages that are especially active in counter-information and propaganda on such topics.

Finally, we analyzed the centrality of individual URLs and accounts in the graph based on their PageRank [37]. We observe that the first Disinformation URL only appears in position 68 of the ranking. The top ten, reported in Table 2, is heterogeneous in terms of both source and treated topic. We however notice the presence of 4 contents directly published on Facebook plus 1 Youtube video, reinforcing the idea that a categorization of disinformation domains is useful but insufficient, because of the great popularity of user generated content.

The top 10 central accounts, reported in Table 3, are:

- 1 group of supporters of the “Five Stars Movement” and of the Government.
- 3 groups of supporters of the philosopher Diego Fusaro and of his recently born party “Vox Italia”. Both Fusaro and “Vox Italia” are known for their anti-establishment propaganda.
- 2 group of supporters of the anti-establishment journalists Marco Travaglio and Paolo Barnard.
- 2 groups/pages supporting the sovereign right leaders Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni.

- 2 groups of supporters of counter-information about vaccines and other related themes, one of which explicitly dedicated to Antonietta Gatti and Stefano Montanari, two scientists often considered models of free information and free scientific research by the anti-establishment propaganda.

By looking at the domains that were most often shared by these accounts, we see, again, that user-generated content put online through Facebook and Youtube is clearly prominent. The scenario that emerges confirms the impression that the success of disinformation and propaganda campaigns relies on the support of well-defined political parties and journalists/scientists, that give credibility to these theories. Quite interestingly, we also see that these are mostly groups and do not coincide with the top ranking accounts emerged in Section 3.2, i.e., the greatest engagement is generated by accounts that are not among the most central in the validated network built upon URL shares. We may argue that controversial opinions are mostly shaped on groups, based on URLs shared by other users, and then just “gathered” on the public pages of political leaders and parties.

5. Conclusions

In this paper we investigated online conversations about COVID-19 and related controversial topics on Facebook, during a period of 4 months and analyzing more than 1.5M posts shared by almost 80k groups and pages. We first noticed that discussions on controversial topics, which had a smaller volume of interactions compared to the pandemic in general, induced polarized clusters of accounts in terms of both topic coverage and lexicon. We then observed that, in accordance with recent literature, sources of supposedly reliable information had a higher engagement compared to websites sharing unreliable content. However, we also realized the limitations of source-based approaches when analyzing an information ecosystem wherein user generated content has a paramount role. Further, we highlighted a “small-world effect” in the sharing network of URLs, with the result that users on Facebook who navigate on a limited set of pages/groups can be potentially exposed to a wide range of content, from extreme propaganda to verified information. Finally, we only considered statistically validated links between URLs and accounts to discover a significant level of coordination for the diffusion of propaganda and disinformation. In this network, the central role is taken by popular groups, in contrast with popular pages being those generating the greatest engagement.

Future directions of research include further investigating the differences in the activity of groups and pages which focus on controversial topics. In particular, we aim to understand whether language differences might be effectively employed to distinguish accounts who were particularly (in)active on specific subjects, and to extend the analysis of reliable vs. unreliable information to platforms for video and image sharing such as YouTube and Instagram.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Stefano Guarino: Data curation, Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Visualization, Investigation, Validation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing. **Francesco Pierri:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Visualization, Investigation, Validation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing. **Marco Di Giovanni:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Visualization, Investigation, Validation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing. **Alessandro Celestini:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Visualization, Investigation, Validation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Table A.1
List of Italian Mainstream news sources.

repubblica.it	corriere.it
tgcom24.mediaset.it	ilmessaggero.it
ilfattoquotidiano.it	fanpage.it
ansa.it	ilgiornale.it
lastampa.it	ilsolo24ore.com
huffingtonpost.it	quotidiano.net
leggo.it	ilmattino.it
nanopress.it	tg24.sky.it
ilgazzettino.it	rainews.it
ilpost.it	agi.it
lettera43.it	adnkronos.com
iltempo.it	today.it
avvenire.it	

Table A.2
List of Italian Disinformation news sources.

agenpress.it	catenaumana.it
essere-informati.it	laveritadiniconaco.altervista.org
voxnews.info	ecplanet.org
direttanews24.com	ilsaperepotere2.blogspot.com
terrarealtime.blogspot.com	lettoquotidiano.it
pandoratv.it	sostenitori.info
notiziariomacapitale.blogspot.com	italianosveglia.com
webtg24.com	madreterra.myblog.it
hackthematrix.it	ilpuntosulmistero.it
tg24-ore.com	informarexresistere.fr
corrieredelcorsaro.it	silenziefalsita.it
libreidee.org	liberamenteservo.com
ilfattoquotidaino.it	saper-link-news.com
compressamente.blogspot.com	disinformazione.it
nibiru2012.it	interagisco.net
lonesto.it	conoscenzealconfine.it
ilprimatonazionale.it	neovitruvian.wordpress.com
comedonchisciotte.org	accademiadellaliberta.blogspot.com
ununiverso.it	byoblu.com
ilvostropensiero.it	mag24.es
skytg24news.it	zapping2017.myblog.it
altrarealta.blogspot.com	5stelleneews.com
adessobasta.org	tmcrew.org
tuttiicriminidegliimmigrati.com	pianetax.wordpress.com
tankerenemy.com	jedanews.it
freeondarevolution.wordpress.com	skynew.it

Table A.3
List of US Disinformation news sources.

drudgereport.com	worldtruth.tv
theblaze.com	activistpost.com
pakalertpress.com	worldnewsdailyreport.com
geoengineeringwatch.org	naturalnews.com
infowars.com	21stcenturywire.com
collective-evolution.com	prisonplanet.com
dcclothesline.com	beforeitsnews.com
disclose.tv	veteranstoday.com
govtsslaves.info	thedailysheep.com
thefreethoughtproject.com	globalresearch.ca
yournewswire.com	realfarmacy.com
breitbart.com	

Appendix

The complete list of Mainstream and Disinformation news sources used in this paper is reported in [Tables A.1–A.5](#). The Top-10 ranking of such news websites by total engagement is reported in [Fig. A.2](#).

Table A.4
List of Russian Disinformation news sources.

russian.rt.com	rt.com
actualidad.rt.com	sputniknews.com
ru.sputnik.kg	mundo.sputniknews.com
br.sputniknews.com	francais.rt.com
sciencealert.com	fr.sputniknews.com
it.sputniknews.com	

Table A.5
List of European Disinformation news sources.

truth-out.org	samnytt.se
lifeneews.com	tellerreport.com
fdesouche.com	latribunadeespana.com
bleacherreport.com	zerohedge.com
thefederalist.com	alnetnet.org
friatider.se	voiceofeuropa.com
conservativereview.com	eutimes.net
freerepublic.com	mintpressnews.com
nyheteridag.se	shoebat.com
newstarget.com	tagesstimme.com
breizh-info.com	davidicke.com
informationliberation.com	cnsnews.com
stateofthenation2012.com	




Fig. A.1. Time series of the daily number of interactions for all posts (*top*) and depending on the controversial topic (*bottom*).




Fig. A.2. Top-10 ranking of news sources per different news domain according to the total engagement generated. In clockwise order from top left we show US, RU, IT, EU disinformation sources and finally IT Mainstream sources.




Fig. A.3. Complementary cumulative distribution function for several metrics. We show all accounts and according to different topics.




Fig. A.4. Boxplot of the distribution of relative changes in the number of members/followers for all accounts, groups and pages.

Table A.6

Top-10 ranking of all accounts by total engagement generated.

Account	No. posts	No. interactions
Le Iene	256	49869767
Fanpage.it	3043	49234295
Corriere della Sera	2119	28004758
Vittorio Sgarbi	98	21865677
Tgcom24	2559	19654257
Sky TG24	1494	19259609
Notizie.it	2513	16907208
Matteo Salvini	215	16719496
Luca Zaia	207	16068773
Lega - Salvini Premier	1386	13187120

Table A.7

Top-10 ranking of 5G accounts by total engagement generated.

Account	No. posts	No. interactions
Ministero della Salute	2	1863319
Nicola Morra	2	982903
Che tempo che fa	4	383441
Quarto Grado	2	294430
Sfera	3	121635
Lorenzo Tosa	2	108586
Abolizione del suffragio universale	3	108491
Il Sole 24 ORE	6	104433
Angelo DURO	2	92855
Fondazione Poliambulanza Istituto Ospedaliero Multispecialistico	2	90481

The lists of Italian words used to define the three controversial topics are the following (the queries included also the feminine and plural forms, omitted here for the sake of clarity):

- “5G”: elettromagnetismo, onda, radiazione, wireless;
- “LABS”: cavia, esperimento, sperimentato, sperimentazione;
- “MIGRANTS”: africa, barcone, clandestino, extracomunitario, immigrato, islam, musulmano, negro, niger, ONG, profugo, senegal, straniero

In Fig. A.1 we show the time series of the daily engagement, in total and for each controversial topic, whereas in Fig. A.3 we plot the complementary cumulative distribution of total engagement (No. reactions), total number of posts (No. posts), total number of shared links (No. links) and number of members (No. members), for all accounts and for the accounts involved in each controversial topic.

The distribution of the relative change in the number of members/followers of the accounts during the observation period is depicted as a boxplot in Fig. A.4. The Top-10 ranking of the accounts by total engagement, considering either all accounts or the accounts involved in a specific controversial topic, is reported in Tables A.6–A.9.

Table A.8

Top-10 ranking of LABS accounts by total engagement generated.

Account	No. posts	No. interactions
Matteo Salvini	19	1443184
Nicola Porro	12	454688
Silvia Sardone	9	416352
Lega - Salvini Premier	55	382654
Medici con l’Africa Cuamm	20	331577
Tg3	18	280473
Sky TG24	7	220786
Local Team	3	200964
Abolizione del suffragio universale	7	173648
Fanpage.it	26	169921

Table A.9

Top-10 ranking of MIGRANTS accounts by total engagement generated.

Account	No. posts	No. interactions
Tgcom24	58	3408934
Matteo Salvini	12	1157440
Kiko.Co	2	826064
Luca Zaia	9	603693
Gianni Simioli	3	577797
Vincenzo De Luca	25	535635
Tg1	3	489346
Sky TG24	20	442357
Il Messaggero.it	21	406447
Tg3	16	382325




Fig. A.5. Average accuracy and F_1 score of the sentiment classification model when texts are truncated at different lengths.




Fig. A.6. Number of posts with the slogan “andràtuttobene” (“it’ll all work out”).

In Fig. A.5 we show the dependence upon the text truncation length of the average accuracy and F_1 score of the sentiment classification model used in this paper. The scores increase as we increase the truncation length, even if the resulting sentences are longer than the maximum length of sentences from our training set (280 characters). To perform this analysis we used a Tripadvisor dataset of 28754 Italian reviews of hotels and restaurants, with an average length of about 700 characters. It can be found and downloaded at the following link (*development* dataset): http://dbdmg.polito.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/dataset_winter_2020.zip.

The time series of the daily number of posts including the #andràtuttobene (“it’ll all work out”) hashtag is shown in Fig. A.6. We notice a clear peak on March 12, which is reflected in a rise of positive sentiment in the dataset.

Finally, in Fig. A.7 we compare the number of URLs and the number of accounts belonging to each connected component of the bipartite




Fig. A.7. Number of URLs and accounts in all components of the bipartite graph other than the giant, for both the whole graph and the topical subgraph. The marker size is proportional to the total number of vertices of the component.

graph of accounts and URLs. We consider both the entire graph and the subgraph induced by controversial topics.

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