Experimenting with Formal Verification and Model-based Development in Railways: the case of UMC and Sparx Enterprise Architect

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Istituto di Scienza e Tecnologie dell'Informazione "A. Faedo"
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche

Formal Methods and Tools Lab

We are hiring!

- The Formal Methods and Tools (FMT) lab of the Institute of Information Science and Technologies (ISTI) of the Italian National Research Council (CNR) offers two temporary positions for research in the field of formal modelling and analysis of critical software systems, in particular but not limited to the railway and service computing domains.

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Overview

- Formal Methods in Railways, Model-based Development
- Sparx Enterprise Architect, UML Model Checker
- Mapping of Sparx EA and UMC models
- Case Study: RBC2RBC handover
- Conclusion

Introduction

- Formal methods in Railways
- Model-based Software/Systems Development (MBSD)
  - mainly based on the OMG UML Standard
- Integration of Formal Methods into MBSD
- Survey on formal verification of UML SM [1]
  - “counterexamples are rarely mapped back to the original models”
  - “UMC could be used to verify UML models”
- Integration of UMC with Sparx EA

[1] André E´., Liu, S., Liu, Y., Choppy, C., Sun, J., Dong, J.S.: Formalizing UML State Machines for Automated Verification–A Survey. ACM Comput. Surv. (2023).

MBSD, Sparx Enterprise Architect

- Development process guided by *models*
- UML: object-oriented paradigm
- State machines: classified behaviour of a class
  - Labels of transitions: `trigger[conditions]/effects`
- Sparx EA: model-based tool based on OMG UML
- Selected within the H2020 Shift2Rail 4SECURail project based on different criteria
  - e.g., composition of state machine

Enterprise Architect

SPARX SYSTEMS

- Executable State Machines
  - Composition of State Machines,
  - Simple instruction for interactions
- Compiled into code for simulation





UML Model Checker (UMC)

- Freely available at https://fmt.isti.cnr.it/umc/V4.8/umc.html
- Currently maintained by Franco Mazzanti
- Oriented towards fast prototyping
- Verification of CTL properties of SM
- On-the-fly model checking [1]
- Automatic translation to [2]:
  - LOTOS NT, ProB
  - Formally verified translation



[1] F. Mazzanti et al.: A state/event-based model-checking approach for the analysis of abstract system properties. Sci. Comput. Program. 76(2)
[2] F. Mazzanti et al.: Formal Modeling and Initial Analysis of the 4SECURail Case Study. MARS@ETAPS 2022

Bidirectional Approach
UMC SM ⇔ Sparx EA SM

Syntactic Restrictions on UML State Machines

- no `entry`, `exit`, or `do` behaviour is present in the states of the model (these behaviors can be equivalently expressed in state transitions),
- interaction happens using only *signals*, and no operation calls are used,
- only one-to-one interactions are used, i.e., no signals broadcast,
- conflicts in enabled transitions are only allowed in the environment,
- no timing behaviour is present (time elapsing is explicated using a TICK event), no internal and local transitions are used, no hierarchical states are used, no history, fork, join and choice nodes are used.

Semantics correspondence

- Sparx State Machines do not have a formal semantics
- No state-space generation in Sparx EA
- Manual inspection of the engine code of ESM:
  - FIFO order of events
  - Deterministic model (no conflicts in enabled transitions)
  - Fixed scheduling of SM
- Semantics of Sparx EA *included* in the semantics of UMC
- Mapping of traces

Environment: Interactive Simulation vs Model Checking





Interactive simulations: the human user acts as the environment.

No automation.



Model checking: the environment is explicitly modelled

- to obtain a fully closed system on which the verification is automatic.

Rules for relating the model

- classes have a relation “has-a” with other classes,
  - every object has a reference to other objects to whom it is interacting with

```
Object.Signal(value1, value2)

%SEND_EVENT("TRIGGER.sig(value1,value2)",CONTEXT_REF(RECIPIENT))%
```



Rules for relating the model

- Signals that are attributes of each class in UMC are in correspondence with global trigger events in the Sparx type Signal and have the same parameters as in UMC.

```
Object.Signal(value1, value2)
```

```
%SEND_EVENT("TRIGGER.sig(value1,value2)",CONTEXT_REF(RECIPIENT))%
```

Send/write message

UMC ⟷ Sparx EA



Receive/read message



Case Study: Communication Supervision Layer (CSL)

- RBC/RBC handover protocol (borrowed from the 4SECURail project)
- CSL responsible for:
  - opening/closing a communication
  - maintaining connection through life signs



D. Basile et al.: Formal Analysis of the UNISIG Safety Application Intermediate Sub-layer - Applying Formal Methods to Railway Standard Interfaces. **FMICS 2021**
F. Mazzanti et al.: Formal Modeling and Initial Analysis of the 4SECURail Case Study. MARS@ETAPS 2022
F. Mazzanti et al.: A Case Study in Formal Analysis of System Requirements. SEFM Workshops 2022
F. Mazzanti et al.: The 4SECURail Formal Methods Demonstrator. RSSRail 2022



UMC ICSL SM



SPARX EA ICSL SM

modelled


«executable statemachine»
RBC2RBC SI: RBC2RBC SI
C_RBC_USER:
RBC_USER
+RBC_USER
:CCSL2RBCUSER
C_CSL: C_CSL
max_receive_timer = 1
max_send_timer = 1
+SAI
:CCSL2SAI
C_SAI: SAI
:CCSL2TIMER
+TIMER
TIMER: TIMER
+TIMER
:ICSL2TIMER
I_RBC_USER:
RBC_USER
+RBC_USER
:ICSL2RBCUSER
I_CSL: I_CSL
max_receive_timer = 1
max_connect_timer = 3
max_send_timer = 1
+SAI
:ICSL2SAI
I_SAI: SAI

Formal verification

mutation

```
TICK [this.receive_timer < this.max_receive_timer &&
      this.send_timer<this.max_send_timer]
      /this.send_timer = this.send_timer+ 1;
      this.receive_timer = this.receive_timer+1;
      %SEND_EVENT("OK_TICK",CONTEXT_REF(TIMER))%;
```




```
send TICK to I_CSL
send SAI_CONNECT_CONFIRM to I_CSL
send TICK to I_CSL
send SAI_DATA_INDICATION.sig_sai
     (LifeSign,nodata) to I_CSL
send TICK to I_CSL
```

```
Abstractions {State: ICSL.sendtimer >
ICSL.maxsendtimer -> sendTimerError}
```

```
EF sendTimerError
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


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


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


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


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


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

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

EF sendTimerError

PlantUML sequence diagram

mutated guard



`ICSL.sendtimer > ICSL.maxsendtimer`

interactive console

https://zenodo.org/record/7956438

Conclusion

- Integration of UMC with Sparx EA
  - Notation restrictions
  - Translation Rules
  - Semantics correspondence
  - The output of the formal verification is traced back to Sparx EA
- Lessons learned and limitations
- Future work:
  - full implementation of an application that is formally verified using the proposed methodology.

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- https://twitter.com/davidebasile (video of the presentation)
- Thanks for your attention!