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# European Immigrations

*Trends, Structures and  
Policy Implications*

MAREK OKÓLSKI (ED.)



AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS

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## **IMISCOE**

### *International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe*

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# **European Immigrations**

Trends, Structures and Policy Implications

*edited by Marek Okólski*

IMISCOE Research

**AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS**

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## 5 Immigrants, markets and policies in Southern Europe

### *The making of an immigration model?*<sup>1</sup>

*João Peixoto, Joaquín Arango, Corrado Bonifazi,  
Claudia Finotelli, Catarina Sabino, Salvatore Strozza and  
Anna Triandafyllidou*

#### 5.1 Introduction

Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have in common two long episodes of strong emigration – during the first period of globalisation and after World War II – and they now share comparable types of foreign immigration. During the first period of globalisation, in the second half of the nineteenth century and before World War I, these countries made an important contribution to intra-European migration and to settlement migration in North America and South America. After World War II, they were among the main suppliers of the growing economies of Western and Northern Europe. Currently, they are experiencing a significant inflow of foreigners. In a relatively short time span, Southern Europe underwent its migration transition, becoming one of the most important areas of attraction on the continent (Bonifazi 2008). According to the available statistics, the number of foreign immigrants in this area can be estimated as ranging from between 950,000 and 1.3 million in 1991 to between 8 million and 10 million in the period 2006-2007. This is a seven- to eight-fold increase in just fifteen years.

Despite some dissimilarities that stem from the different histories of these countries, their diverse social and economic characteristics and their specific cultural and colonial links to other geographical areas, many reasons for the growth of foreign immigration were similar across all four of them. It is worth mentioning several notable economic trends in recent decades: the improvement in living standards and educational levels of the native youth, both of which increased labour expectations; the persistence of significant informal economies and of segmentation processes in the labour markets; the effects of low fertility rates on labour supply; and the overall

limitations of Mediterranean welfare systems, which are largely unable to provide for their populations' evolving needs, including those attributable to the ageing process. Furthermore, the political and economic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) intensified the push forces into this area. While the gradual incorporation of most of those countries into the European Union migration system resulted in a relaxing of visa policies, labour migration from that area had been de facto tolerated even before the EU enlargement. This increased availability of foreign workers matched the growing needs of Southern European labour markets.

Engaging in a comparative analysis of immigration experiences in Southern European countries is not a novel exercise. Since the early 1990s, the many similarities in timing and other characteristics of immigration in these countries led to the frequent collaboration of researchers and policy-makers in order to discuss the common trends. During a period that culminated at the turn of the century, numerous articles, books and special editions of journals were released (see e.g. King & Rybaczuk 1993; Iosifides & King 1996; Baganha 1997; Baldwin-Edwards 1997; King & Black 1997; Baldwin-Edwards & Arango 1999; King, Lazaridis & Tsardanidis 2000; King 2002; Arango 2003; Ribas-Mateos 2004; Ritaine 2005; and, more recently, King & Thomson 2008<sup>2</sup> and González-Enríquez & Triandafyllidou 2009). Many of these works designated these new immigration experiences as a Southern European or Mediterranean 'model of immigration' (King 2000), which differed in several ways from the model that predominated in other European host countries during the second half of the twentieth century, when the Fordist type of capitalism was dominant.<sup>3</sup>

After the turn of the century, academic interest in drawing comparative analyses between the Southern European countries somewhat subsided. This is rather surprising, since the bulk of the inflows into Southern Europe occurred mostly after the late 1990s. Indeed, the framework and underlying immigration factors remained much the same as they had been before. But during the new century, some of the characteristics of the inflows changed, several new policies were enacted and the overall outcomes of migration, including immigrant integration, varied. There thus exists a clear need to update the comparative exercises carried out previously. This is one of the objectives of this chapter.

Furthermore, it is important to understand the particular position of Southern European countries in the European international migration system when compared to the 'old' or 'mature' immigration countries in Northern and Western Europe and to the 'recent' or 'future' immigration countries in CEE. As discussed in chapters 1 and 2 in this volume, the different timings of the migration transition – meaning the process by which countries change their migration status from net out-migration to in-migration – depend on a broader economic and social framework, thus impacting differently over immigrants' modes of labour incorporation, social

integration, public attitudes and immigration policy. In certain respects, the southern context has been unique, resulting from its specific moments of transition and structural similarity, whilst in other respects it shares the traits and dilemmas of its predecessors and, most probably, its followers.

The sections of this chapter are organised as follows. First, a detailed analysis of flows and stocks of foreign immigration will be set forth. Second, as a result of the centrality of labour demand variables in explaining immigration in this context, special attention will be devoted to immigrants' labour market incorporation. Third, the endemic presence of irregular migration in these countries will be described, together with its explanatory factors (including the informal economy and inadequate regulation) and policy attempts to regulate it. Next, other aspects of immigration policy will be examined, including labour recruitment, control and integration policies. Finally, some general considerations and final conclusions will be drawn, displaying the main similarities, explaining factors and overall position of Southern Europe compared to other European host countries.

## 5.2 Flows and stocks of foreign immigration


It is well known that data on international migration are collected in different statistical sources and that, even when they are taken from the same type of source, they are not always comparable over time and between countries. The specific features of national legal systems have a great impact on data. In the Southern European case, the endemic character of irregular migration adds to the difficulty of immigration's measurement.<sup>4</sup>

### 5.2.1 *Flows and stocks of foreign immigration*

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, according to the available sources, immigration exhibited a spectacular upsurge in Italy and above all in Spain (Figure 5.1). The Spanish trend is the most impressive. The data of the Padrón Municipal de Habitantes, the municipal population registry, which also include irregular migrants, show continuous and regular growth in foreign inflows since 1996. The volume of this growth is amazing, as in only twelve years the size of the inflow increased by a factor of 55: from 17,000 arrivals in 1996 to 921,000 in 2007.

The growing share of foreign immigration within the total inflow (foreigners and nationals) signals its increasing importance in the Southern European countries (Figure 5.1). In Italy, since 1996 this share has exceeded 80 per cent of the total inflow and is now estimated at 92 per cent; in Spain it has been over 90 per cent since 2000 and reached 96 per cent

**Figure 5.1** Immigration of foreign citizens from abroad: Italy, Portugal<sup>1</sup> and Spain,<sup>2</sup> 1990-2007 (absolute values and percentages of foreigners in the overall immigration)



<sup>1</sup> Data refer only to *solicitações de autorização de residência* (*autorizações de permanência concedidas* and *vistos de longa duração concedidos pelos postos consulares* are not considered).

<sup>2</sup> Data for 1996 are not perfectly comparable with those for earlier years due to a reform of the Padrón Municipal.

Sources: Italy: ISTAT, Anagrafi comunali; Portugal: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF) – Ministério da Administração Interna; Spain: INE, Padrón Municipal.

in 2007. It is worth considering that, until the early 1990s, nationals were still almost half of the total inflow entering these two countries.

The evolution of the number of foreigners in the four countries since the 1980s can be evaluated using stock data from population censuses, population registers and permits to stay or residence permits (Table 5.1).<sup>5</sup> Regardless of technical differences, all the available information indicates that, between 1991 and 2007, the presence of foreign citizens has increased remarkably in all four countries. The pace of this growth, however, seems to be much more rapid in Italy and – above all – in Spain as compared to Greece and Portugal. In Italy, in particular, data indicate that the number of regular immigrants grew from some hundred thousand in 1991 to between 2.4 and 3.4 million in 2007. Consequently, the share of foreigners within the total population also increased from about 1 per cent to 4-6 per cent. The estimated number of foreigners reaches 4.3 million, or 7.2 per cent of the total population living in Italy, if non-resident regular immigrants and illegal immigrants are also taken into consideration (Blangiardo 2009).

**Table 5.1** Foreign population according to different sources in the Southern European immigration countries around 1991, 2001 and 2007 (absolute values in thousands and percentages of total population at the end of the year or the census data)

Country/categories	Absolute values (in thousands)			% of total population		
	1991	2001	2007	1991	2001	2007
<b>Italy</b>						
Permits to stay holders <sup>1</sup>	649	1,448	2,415	1.1	2.5	4.1
Residents <sup>2</sup>	356	1,335	3,433	0.6	2.3	5.8
Estimate of total foreign population <sup>3</sup>	1,002	2,460	4,328	1.8	4.3	7.2
<b>Spain</b>						
Permits to stay holders <sup>4</sup>	361	1,109	3,979	0.9	2.7	8.6
Residents (census) <sup>5</sup>	353	1,572	...	0.9	3.8	...
Residents of Padrón (total foreign population) <sup>6</sup>	...	1,978	5,221	...	4.8	11.3
<b>Greece</b>						
Permits to stay holders <sup>7</sup>	149	...	696	1.5	...	6.3
Residents <sup>8</sup>	166	762	884	1.6	7.0	7.9
Estimate of total foreign population <sup>9</sup>	...	...	1,092	...	...	9.8
<b>Portugal</b>						
Legal residents and holders of visas <sup>10</sup>	...	351	446	...	3.4	4.2
Residents <sup>11</sup>	107	233	402	1.1	2.2	3.8
Estimate of total foreign population <sup>12</sup>	...	...	496	...	...	4.7

<sup>1</sup> Permits to stay collected by Ministero dell'Interno and revised by ISTAT; the last data is referred at the end of 2006

<sup>2</sup> Census data as of 24 October 1991 and 21 October 2001; 2007 municipal population registers data (Anagrafi comunali)

<sup>3</sup> For 1991 and 2001: our evaluations from ISTAT data and estimates of irregular migrants in Blangiardo and Tanturri (2006); for 2007: Blangiardo (2009)

<sup>4</sup> *Tarjeta o autorización de residencia*

<sup>5</sup> Census data as of 1 March 1991 and 1 May 2001

<sup>6</sup> Data of Padrón Municipal, including illegal foreigners

<sup>7</sup> Last data is end 2005

<sup>8</sup> Census data as of 14 March 1991 and 18 March 2001; 2007: Eurostat estimation

<sup>9</sup> Triandafyllidou and Maroufouf (2008) estimation april 2008

<sup>10</sup> 2001 value is the sum of residence permits and permits to stay; 2007 value is the sum of residence permits, extended permits to stay (*autorização de permanência prorrogada*), granted long-term visas (*visto de longa duração concedido*) and extended long-term visas (*visto de longa duração prorrogado*)

<sup>11</sup> Census data as of 16 March 1991 and 12 March 2001; 2007 data on residence permits (*estatuto legal de residente – autorizações de residência*)

<sup>12</sup> Legal residents, holders of visas and estimate of irregular immigrants (Lusa 2008)

Sources: Own elaboration from national statistical sources

The increase recorded for the stocks of foreigners in Spain is even more marked. Permit-to-stay holders and usual residents, who numbered less than 400,000, grew to almost 4 million and over 5.2 million, respectively. The latter value includes also illegal migrants. The percentage of foreigners in the Spanish population grew from less than 1 per cent in 1991 to 8.6 per cent and 11.3 per cent, respectively, for the two groups in question. High levels – in terms of percentage – of immigrants within the total population were recorded in Greece as well, with 7.9 per cent of residents and 9.8 per cent of total immigrants, including legal and estimated illegal presences. The number of regular foreigners in Greece's case was around 900,000, while the stock reached almost 1.1 million if irregular migrants are included. In Portugal, legal foreign immigration was almost 450,000, or around 4.2 per cent of the total population. These values would increase to 500,000 and 4.7 per cent, respectively, if an estimate of irregular immigrants was added.

By and large, labour migration and family migration have constituted the two main flows entering Southern Europe in the last 25 years. Southern European countries, generally speaking, do not seem to be countries of asylum and do not attract a large number of foreign students. Statistical evidence drawn from different sources, including the national census and registers of permits to stay and of residence permits, confirms these characteristics.

The main reasons for migration (work and family reunion) have a significant effect on the demographic structure of immigration flows. In fact, the first working-age cohorts (20-39 years old) generally accounted for the majority of all immigrants, while the share of the youngest population (less than twenty years old) usually fluctuated around 20 to 30 per cent of the total. The immigration of foreigners aged 60 or older accounted for a negligible share of total arrivals in Italy, while the percentages recorded in Spain and Portugal are higher, likely attributable to the relevance of retirement migration into these two countries.

The gender structure of foreign immigration flows has been relatively balanced in recent years. In Italy and Portugal, women have generally predominated in the current decade, while in Spain their share of the total has oscillated between 45 and 48 per cent. However, this statistic can reflect deep imbalances in the gender composition of the different national groups, in some cases in favour of men and in other cases in favour of women.

### *5.2.2 Main nationalities and their evolution*

The evolution of foreign immigration in terms of area of origin is characterised by an increase in the size and proportion of immigration from CEE countries and from the Third World, and a corresponding reduction in the percentage from developed countries, despite its increase in absolute terms

(Table 5.2a, b). Alongside these two main common trends, the situation presents important and interesting differences between the Southern European countries. In fact, each country has a specific area of attraction, usually as a result of its geographical position, its history, its colonial heritage (if it exists) and its cultural and linguistic links with other countries.

Italy is probably the country where that collection of factors has been the least important. The proportion of foreigners from More Developed Countries (MDCs) fell from 32.7 per cent of the total in 1991 to 5.9 per cent in 2007. At the same time, immigration from CEE countries exhibited an extraordinary increase: from the period 1991-2007 it increased 30.2-fold, totalling more than 1.6 million and representing 47 per cent of the immigration total. There was also a strong but lesser-marked increase in immigration from developing countries, rising from 186,000 in 1991 to 1.6 million in 2007, and signalling a reduction from 52.3 to 47 per cent of the total. In the current decade, there is a clear prevalence of Romanians, Albanians and Moroccans, as well as a gradual stabilisation of many other previously numerous communities.

In Spain and Portugal, the level of immigration from MDCs has always been higher than in Italy, as a result of the greater significance of retirement migration. In 2007, it still accounted for 22.2 per cent of the total in Spain and for 24.8 per cent in Portugal. In these two countries, immigration from CEE is less significant than in Italy, although Romanians have become the biggest immigrant community in Spain, and Ukrainians constitute the third-largest immigrant community in Portugal. The main characteristic of the Spanish migration model is the large inflow from Latin America. The tightening of the United States' immigration policies after 9/11 probably contributed to directing the flows caused by the economic crises that troubled several Latin American countries to Europe (Pellegrino 2004). Linguistic and cultural bonds with the region due to Spain's colonial past probably constituted the main factors for migrants' choosing Spain as a preferred destination.

As regards Portugal, a marked increase in immigration from the CEE countries has appeared in the last decade. Until the end of the 1990s, immigration flows into the country were mostly reflective of its colonial past and had developed a specific migration 'system', unified by the Portuguese language.<sup>6</sup> The reasons for this 'Eastern revolution' are probably related to Portugal's EU membership and to the enlargement of the European migration system. The largest immigrant groups in the country are from Cape Verde, Brazil and Ukraine.

Some basic facts distinguish Greece's recent migratory trends from those observed in the rest of Southern Europe. First, a dramatic increase in the immigrant population has occurred despite a great number of 'administrative deportations' (2.2 million in the period 1992-2001), carried out with the intention of dissuading immigrant settlement. Forced circular migration

**Table 5.2a** Foreign resident population by geographical areas and main countries of citizenship, Southern European immigration countries, 1991, 2001 and 2007 (absolute values in thousands and percentages by citizenship and of females) (Greece and Italy)

Main countries of citizenship	Greece		Main countries of citizenship		Italy	
	Number (thousands)	% by citizenship	% females	Number (thousands)	% by citizenship	% females
<b>1991 Census</b>						
Total	167.3	100.0	46.4	356.2	100.0	47.1
MDCs	77.7	46.4	54.4	116.5	32.7	59.3
CEE	49.8	29.8	37.8	53.5	15.0	48.9
LDCs	39.8	23.8	41.6	186.2	52.3	38.9
Albania	20.6	12.3	29.7	39.9	11.2	19.0
Cyprus	14.7	8.8	48.6	22.7	6.4	60.8
US	13.9	8.3	50.9	17.1	4.8	46.3
Russian Federation	12.9	7.7	49.5	16.7	4.7	21.9
Turkey	11.1	6.6	51.1	15.8	4.4	64.0
<b>2001 Census</b>						
Total	762.2	100.0	45.5	1,334.9	100.0	50.5
MDCs	83.9	11.0	56.6	180.9	13.5	63.9
CEE	577.4	75.8	45.2	436.7	32.7	50.9
LDCs	100.9	13.2	37.8	717.3	53.7	46.9
Albania	438.0	57.5	41.3	180.1	13.5	39.8
Bulgaria	35.1	4.6	60.4	173.1	13.0	43.7
Georgia	22.9	3.0	57.0	74.9	5.6	53.5
Romania	22.0	2.9	43.4	54.0	4.0	61.1
US	18.1	2.4	51.5	49.3	3.7	46.8



2005 Permits to stay <sup>2</sup>		2007 Population registers (Anagrafe)							
	Total	MDCs	CEE	LDCs	Albania	Bulgaria	Romania	Ukraine	Pakistan
Total	692.4	100.0	37.7	37.7	3,432.7	100.0	50.4	59.9	54.4
MDCs	..	..	..	..	201.1	5.9	54.4	45.3	47.3
CEE	605.0	87.4	38.5	31.9	1,614.9	47.0	47.3	47.3	47.3
LDCs	87.4	12.6	31.9	31.9	1,616.7	47.1	45.3	45.3	47.3
Albania	481.7	69.6	31.4	31.4	625.3	18.2	52.9	44.7	40.8
Bulgaria	44.0	6.4	65.2	65.2	401.9	11.7	44.7	40.8	47.3
Romania	25.4	3.7	47.2	47.2	365.9	10.7	40.8	47.3	80.4
Ukraine	19.8	2.9	81.7	81.7	156.5	4.6	47.3	80.4	80.4
Pakistan	15.8	2.3	1.2	1.2	132.7	3.9	80.4	80.4	80.4

<sup>1</sup> MDCs include North America, Japan, Israel, Oceania and other countries of Europe, excluding former socialist countries; CEE includes former socialist countries of Europe and Turkey; Less Developed Countries (LDCs) include Africa, Latin America and Asia (except Japan and Israel).

<sup>2</sup> Citizens of MDCs are not considered because of their strong underestimation (only 3,569). In addition, the register accounted for only 3,366 people under age fifteen (less than 0.5 per cent of the total).

Sources: Own elaboration from national statistical sources.

**Table 5.2b** Foreign resident population by geographical areas<sup>1</sup> and main countries of citizenship, Southern European immigration countries, 1991, 2001 and 2007 (absolute values in thousands and percentages by citizenship and of females) (Portugal and Spain))

Main countries of citizenship	Portugal			Spain		
	Number (thousands)	% by citizenship	% females	Number (thousands)	% by citizenship	% females
				Main countries of citizenship		
				1991 Census		
Total	106.6	100.0	50.4	353.4	100.0	51.1
MDCs	43.2	40.6	52.0	219.8	62.2	52.5
CEE	2.3	2.1	50.7	4.0	1.1	48.0
LDCs	61.1	57.3	49.3	129.6	36.7	48.9
Cape Verde	15.7	14.7	45.5	53.6	15.2	52.5
France	13.7	12.9	53.6	34.0	9.6	53.2
Brazil	13.5	12.7	53.0	31.4	8.9	38.7
Angola	9.4	8.8	54.8	27.8	7.9	51.0
Venezuela	8.5	7.9	46.6	24.2	6.9	58.0
				2001 Population registers (Padrón)		
Total	232.7	100.0	45.8	1,977.9	100.0	47.0
MDCs	64.1	27.5	50.7	541.3	27.4	49.4
CEE	20.5	8.8	23.5	187.8	9.5	44.8
LDCs	148.2	63.7	46.8	1,248.8	63.1	46.3
Angola	37.0	15.9	49.1	307.5	15.5	32.9
Cape Verde	33.1	14.2	48.7	259.5	13.1	50.7
Brazil	31.9	13.7	46.8	191.0	9.7	57.6
Guinea-Bissau	15.8	6.8	37.3	128.1	6.5	50.6
France	15.4	6.6	54.1	113.8	5.8	50.3

2007 Legal residents (SEF)		2007 Population registers (Padrón)				
Total	401.6	100.0	45.3	5,220.6	100.0	46.8
MDCs	99.7	24.8	46.9	1,160.0	22.2	46.8
CEE	79.2	19.7	41.9	1,180.3	22.6	47.3
LDCs	222.7	55.5	45.8	2,880.3	55.2	46.6
Cape Verde	61.1	15.2	44.9	Romania	14.0	46.3
Brazil	55.7	13.9	52.8	Morocco	12.3	36.7
Ukraine	34.2	8.5	38.6	Ecuador	8.0	50.8
Angola	30.4	7.6	46.3	UK	6.7	49.2
UK	23.6	5.9	47.2	Colombia	5.4	55.6

<sup>1</sup> MDCs include North America, Japan, Israel, Oceania and other countries of Europe, excluding former socialist countries; CEE includes former socialist countries of Europe and Turkey; Less Developed Countries (LDCs) include Africa, Latin America and Asia (except Japan and Israel).

<sup>2</sup> Citizens of MDCs are not considered because of their strong underestimation (only 3,569). In addition, the register accounted for only 3,366 people under age fifteen (less than 0.5 per cent of the total).

Sources: Own elaboration from national statistical sources.

was a common pattern for Albanians. Second, one national group (Albanians) represent about 70 per cent of the whole foreign presence. No similar level of prevalence of nationals from a single source country is found in the other three Southern European countries considered here. More generally, the proximity of the sending countries distinguishes the Greek migration experience, as even other important immigrant groups (Bulgarians and Romanians) come from neighbouring countries. Finally, Greece is the Southern European country most often sought out by refugees (especially Iraqis and Afghans arriving from Turkey). Initially considered only as a country of transit, Greece has become more and more attractive to asylum seekers, especially as other EU countries restricted asylum policies.

### **5.3 Immigrants and the labour market**

#### *5.3.1 The strength of labour demand*

Economic immigration has long been the main channel of entry and eventual residence of foreign immigrants in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Together with the age profile of immigrants, this contributes to the fact that the employment rate of foreign immigrants is high compared to other Northern and Western European host countries. According to OECD (2008) data for foreign- and native-born populations in 2006, immigrants in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain exhibit higher employment rates than natives. This is the case for both male and female immigrants. Generally, however, the unemployment situation for foreigners is relatively less favourable than it is for natives. Vulnerability to unemployment also seems to be lower for immigrant men than for women. Recent evidence suggests that the over-representation of immigrants in unemployment statistics mostly occurs in periods of economic recession (Martin 2009).

The strong association immigration has with the labour market in Southern Europe results from a number of factors. From an economic point of view, these include periods of rapid economic expansion (often resulting from an injection of EU funds); an economic fabric largely based in labour-intensive sectors; the seasonal character of many industries (such as agriculture and tourism); the non-transferability of many of the fast-growing industries (activities such as construction and services cannot be delocalised); the high segmentation of the labour market; the increase in flexible labour arrangements; and the importance of the informal economy. These factors correspond to a combination of country-specific characteristics and general traits of the post-Fordist context.

One of the most impactful factors is the informal economy. The extent of informal arrangements has been growing in all post-Fordist economies, but their longer histories in Southern Europe have made the region's

economies more prone to informality. A study by Friedrich Schneider and Robert Klinglmaier (2004) confirms that the relevance of the informal economy is a common characteristic of Southern European countries, where its volume far exceeds those of other OECD countries. The authors estimated that the size of the shadow economy in the period 2002-2003 was about 28.3 per cent of GDP in Greece, 26.2 per cent of GDP in Italy and 22.3 per cent of GDP in Portugal and Spain. Since foreigners are over-represented in this sector, it has typically provided a privileged route of entry for labour migrants, regular and irregular (Baganha 1998; Reyneri 1998; Mingione & Quassoli 2000; Fakiolas 2000).

From a social point of view, the native population's living standards and educational levels have increased in recent decades – largely coinciding with women's emancipation – and natives began refusing to work in less desirable jobs (King, Lazaridis & Tsardanidis 2000). In addition to fulfilling these roles, immigrants have been supplying services that have often not been available in the weak welfare regimes of Southern European countries. That is, their welfare systems provide little direct assistance and thus rely heavily on family members to care for the young, the elderly and others in need of assistance. To alleviate this burden, families have begun relying on immigrants to fulfil tasks such as housekeeping, babysitting and caring for the elderly (Sciortino 2004). In sum, constraints related to the welfare state have contributed to the strength of labour demand in these countries.

Demographic factors such as low fertility rates, high life expectancy and the related ageing of the population have also contributed to this situation. On the one hand, a shrinking population is linked to a diminished labour supply. On the other, the amount of care-related work is increasing as a result of the population's ageing. It can therefore be reasonably foreseen that quantitative labour shortages and the demand for care-related services not only will continue but will exhibit significant growth as well.

### *5.3.2 Main occupational sectors and working conditions*

The economic incorporation of foreign immigrants in Southern Europe often occurs in low-skilled jobs and under precarious conditions. Immigrants are often employed in a few specific sectors, usually in less stable, less paid and less protected jobs (the so-called 3D jobs: dirty, dangerous and demeaning), which correspond to the least-protected parts of a highly segmented labour market (the secondary labour market, in dual labour market theory terms). For all Southern European countries, data for economic sectors indicate that immigrants are usually employed in the service sector (mainly domestic work, retail trade, hotels and restaurants), construction, manufacturing and agriculture.

According to OECD data on foreign-born employment in the period 2005-2006 (OECD 2008), the construction sector is quite important in all four countries, representing 29.1 per cent of the total foreign-born employment in Greece, 19.7 per cent in Spain, 14.8 per cent in Portugal and 14.2 per cent in Italy. Mining, manufacturing and the energy sector are particularly relevant for Italy, where they together represent 23.6 per cent of total foreign-born employment, known to be concentrated in the Central and Northern industrial regions. By contrast, the same sectors are less important in Greece (15.4 per cent), Portugal (13.8 per cent) and Spain (13.0 per cent). The service sector (mainly wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants and domestic work) is also an important recruiter of immigrants in all four countries. Hotels and restaurants account for 14.2 per cent in Spain, 10.2 per cent in Greece, 8.7 per cent in Italy and 8.2 per cent in Portugal. Households (domestic services) account for 13.9 per cent in Greece, 13.3 per cent in Spain, 10.4 per cent in Italy and 4.9 per cent in Portugal (although these data are decidedly under-evaluated). Finally, employment in agriculture is also considerable, although its significance has been declining in recent years: data for the period 2005-2006 show that, of total foreign-born employment, the agriculture and fishing sector account for 6.2 per cent in Greece, 5.6 per cent in Spain, 3.5 per cent in Italy and 2.0 per cent in Portugal.

Immigrants' overqualification also seems to be a general trend in these countries. The lack of employment opportunities in their trades forces migrants to accept jobs that often do not correspond to their qualifications. Comparative ratios show that immigrant overqualification, as compared to that of the native population, is substantial in the countries of Southern Europe (OECD 2006). There are differences among immigrant groups, since educational levels vary by nationality. It is mainly in the case of Eastern European immigrants that there is a considerable mismatch between educational level and type of work.

Closely related to these employment patterns, the working conditions of most immigrants are poor. This applies to, among other factors, salaries and contractual arrangements. Immigrants tend to earn less than the native-born. In all countries, temporary work has been expanding over the years. The probability of getting a temporary job is also greater for immigrants than for the native population. Temporary work is often seen as one method for satisfying certain labour shortages, especially low-skilled ones, without admitting large numbers of workers into sectors that may eventually be subject to significant structural change. This reality reflects the greater precariousness that immigrants have to face in the labour market. According to OECD data, the share of temporary jobs among immigrants is nearly 45 per cent in Spain and almost 30 per cent in Portugal, i.e. respectively 20 and 16 percentage points more than for the native population (OECD 2006: 58).

Finally, as regards complementarity or substitution/competition with natives' employment, the former is by far the most prevalent. This has already been well established by former comparative studies on immigrants' insertion into Southern European labour markets. For example, Emilio Reyneri and Maria Baganha (2001: 49) stated that:

[...] in segmented labour markets, such as those of the Southern European countries, migrant workers are in competition only with marginal sectors of the domestic labour supply and/or in narrow occupational areas [...]. Conflicts between migrants and the local population only seldom concern labour market problems.

#### **5.4 Irregular migration and regularisation processes**

##### *5.4.1 The size and determinants of irregular stocks*

The challenge of irregular immigration affects several countries in Europe. However, it is in Southern Europe that the number of irregular migrants is particularly high.<sup>7</sup> Since the 1990s, irregular migration has been perceived as a chronic disease of Southern European migration regimes. It would likely be no exaggeration if we affirmed that most foreigners now living legally in Southern European countries experienced a significant period of irregularity before getting their first residence permit. For this reason, estimation of the size of irregular migration became a priority for national governments and the European institutions. Admittedly, estimating irregular foreign population is not an easy task, though there have been efforts to provide reliable estimates of irregular foreigners. The frequent regularisation processes carried out in almost all Southern European countries, for instance, provide reliable figures about the presence of irregular migrants. In addition, various other research groups have provided additional estimates based on other available sources.

In Spain, based on information provided by the Padrón Municipal register, Joaquín Recaño and Andreu Domingo (2005) tried, quite successfully, to estimate irregularity before the regularisation of 2005.<sup>8</sup> Similar efforts have been made by other Spanish researchers such as, for instance, Alonso Pajares (2006), Lorenzo Cachón (2007) and Héctor Cebolla and Amparo Gonzalez (2008). Most of these researchers agreed that there had been about 900,000 irregular migrants before the 2005 regularisation. According to Cebolla and Gonzalez (2008), the irregularity rate reached its peak in 2003, when 53 per cent of the foreign population was estimated to be irregular. The percentage decreased after the 2005 regularisation and the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU.

In Italy, there have been several attempts to estimate the number of irregular migrants (Table 5.3). The estimates provided by Gian Carlo

Blangiardo (2009) suggest a very high level of irregularity at the end of the 1990s and a decrease afterwards. Things changed significantly after the 2002 regularisation and the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU in 2007. The impact of the European enlargement worked as a de facto regularisation in the case of Romanian immigrants. However, according to more recent figures, the number of irregular migrants has been increasing again.

**Table 5.3** *Estimates of immigrants and irregular migrants in Italy*

Author <sup>1</sup>	Year	Immigrants (thousands)	Irregular migrants	
			thousands	%
Natale (1986)	1985	523-725	97-299	19-41
Birindelli (1990)	1990	824	140	17
ISTAT (1991)	1990	1,144	623	55
Blangiardo (1997) <sup>2</sup>	1995	833-912	344-423	41-46
Natale and Strozza (1997)	1995	1,146	431	36
Blangiardo (1998) <sup>2 3</sup>	1998	982-1,101	176-295	18-27
Blangiardo (2006) <sup>2 4</sup>	2005	3,357	541	16
Blangiardo (2008)	2007	3,982	349	9

<sup>1</sup> Unless stated otherwise, values at beginning of year

<sup>2</sup> Only citizens of CEE and Third World countries

<sup>3</sup> 15 April

<sup>4</sup> 1 July

Sources: Strozza (2004) and some of the authors indicated in the table.

Recent estimates of the irregular migrant presence in Greece suggest numbers close to 200,000. More specifically, Anna Triandafyllidou and Michaela Maroufouf (2008) estimate the number of irregular migrants to be at 167,000; Theodore Lianos and his co-authors (2008) suggest that irregular migrants in Greece range between 172,000 and 209,000; and Thanos Maroukis (2009) arrives at an estimate of 205,000 irregular migrants living in Greece in 2007. In Portugal, official institutions have recently provided an estimate of irregular migration levels, suggesting a number of 50,000 (Lusa 2008).

The presence of irregular migrants in Southern European countries has often been explained by the existence of weak external controls, by the countries' inexperience with immigration and by geographic positions that favour clandestine entries (Baldwin-Edwards 1999). A phenomenon like irregular migration, however, cannot be explained through unilateral cause-effect relationships. As a matter of fact, the question of irregularity is part of a more general analysis of the mechanisms of international migration. Irregularity is brought about, first of all, by the intersection of immigration regulations with large migration flows, and reflects what Douglas Massey (1999) has called the 'post-modern' paradox between global forces and



restrictive policy rules. In this respect, irregular migration is the product of several factors, according to what could be summarised as an 'equation of irregularity' based on the intensity of the flows, restrictive regulations, the attractiveness of the informal economy, geographic proximity, the quality of controls and the activities of the smuggling industry (Arango 2005). All these aspects have been particularly important for the development of irregular migration systems in Southern Europe.

As will be elaborated in the next section, Southern European admission policies were characterised by a high degree of restrictiveness and inflexibility that hampered effective controls of the flows. As a consequence, they have been unable to craft or enforce efficient regulation, despite having acknowledged the necessity of foreign labour. The informal economy acts as a strong magnet for irregular migrants, and becomes an increasingly important element within the development of irregular migration systems (Reyneri 1998). That is why internal labour market controls are imbued with a particular significance in the struggle against irregular migration. As a matter of fact, the size of the informal economy corresponds to the weakness of labour market controls in all four of the Southern European countries.

Along with the pull factor posed by the informal economy, the presence of irregular migrants has clearly been bolstered by the geographic positioning of Southern European countries and their difficulties controlling their maritime borders. The increase of migration flows into Southern Europe coincided with the necessity of protecting common European borders after the coming into force of the Schengen Agreement.<sup>9</sup> Their relative lack of experience in dealing with inflows and exposed sea borders prompted a certain degree of mistrust of the Southern European member states, which was also encouraged by the media effect of 'boat people' arriving on their coasts. Smuggling also played a role. Smuggling networks in Spain have been very active and flexible. In the last couple of years, they have shifted their main routes from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Canary Islands, due to more intensive controls in the Mediterranean area. In Italy, networks seem to be particularly active on the Southern coasts, exploiting the Libyan route, because of the Spanish authorities' efforts to control the Moroccan channel. In the case of Greece, smugglers are active at sea and land borders, ranging from small informal networks to several more mafia-like organisations. Almost everywhere, smuggling networks seem to be flexible organisations that are able to adapt very quickly to the defensive strategies adopted by the nation-states (Pastore, Monzini & Sciortino 2006; Coslovi 2007; Carling 2007).

However, most evidence suggests that irregular immigration in Southern Europe usually begins with overstaying and not with a clandestine entry (see e.g. ENI-survey 2008 and Pastore et al. 2006). Where this is the case, several favourable visa conditions come into play. Today's visa policies and their effects are not a consequence of national decisions, but rather of

European policies, which identify the countries whose citizens need a visa to enter the Schengen space. However, visa policy is also embedded in the interests of each country and the migration systems in which they are involved. Some countries might thus be more generous or liberal than others because of economic and historical ties with a sending country. Most irregular migration systems in Portugal consist, for instance, of overstayers proceeding from the PALOP countries, Eastern Europe and Brazil. Furthermore, the existence of the Schengen space allows 'false tourists' to move around Europe with a visa obtained by the foreign representation of one EU member state, a process often fuelled by smuggling networks. This was for example the case of Ukrainian immigrants who obtained their visas from Germany and subsequently moved to Italy, Spain and Portugal, where they could find a job in the construction and domestic service sectors (Finotelli & Sciortino 2006).

Finally, irregular migration in Southern Europe has been perceived favourably by the native population and administration. Indeed, living as an irregular is significantly easier in Southern than in Northern Europe. In most Southern European countries, irregular migrants have access to compulsory education and basic health services. Nevertheless, irregular migrants remain in a precarious position and represent a challenge to the control capacity of the state.

#### 5.4.2 *Regularisations as ex post regulation instruments*

The regularisation of irregular immigrants is, of course, not a Southern European peculiarity. Many European countries had to resort to a regularisation at least once in their migration history. However, there are few doubts that the majority of such processes were carried out in Southern Europe (De Bruycker & Apap 2000).<sup>10</sup> For this reason, regularisations have often been considered proof of the Southern European 'public ambiguity' towards irregular migration and for the Southern incapacity to control migration (Brochmann 1993; Baldwin-Edwards 1999).<sup>11</sup> As a matter of fact, the lack of efficient recruitment procedures turned regularisations into the most useful way to 'repair' a posteriori the structural mismatches of most Southern European migration regimes (Arango & Jachimowicz 2005). Since the 1980s, six regularisation processes have been instituted in Spain, while the Italian and Portuguese governments carried out five regularisations in the same period.<sup>12</sup> In Greece, regularisations are a more recent phenomenon, since the first one was executed in 1998, followed by two others in 2001 and the period 2005-2006 (Table 5.4).

Regularisations have come to represent, both at the national and at the international level, a very controversial issue, one whose necessity is downplayed by the majority of the political parties. Nevertheless, in past years, regularisations were not linked to a particular government majority

**Table 5.4** *Overview of regularisation dates in Southern European migration regimes, 1985-2007*

<i>Spain</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Portugal</i>
1985	1986	-	1992-1993
1991	1990	-	1996
1996	1995	-	2001
2000	1998	1998	2003
2001	2002	2001	2004
2005	(2006)	2005-2006	(2007)

Source: Own elaboration

in all Southern European countries. Both left- and right-wing governments carried out various regularisations in all countries (González-Enríquez & Triandafyllidou 2009). Moreover, regularisation processes in each country exhibit a certain degree of periodicity, though all of them were touted as exceptional 'one-time-only' measures by the national governments. In the absence of effective recruitment systems, they soon became part of the regulation system, used to 'repair' the lack of an efficient migration policy.

Italy and Spain regularised the highest number of irregular migrants, not only in all of Southern Europe, but also as compared to other European countries (Table 5.5). In Spain, about 1.2 million foreigners have been regularised since 1986, and half of them after the regularisation of 2005 – which was, without a doubt, the most successful regularisation ever carried out in the country. Italy's case is similar. Irregularity increased after the surge in the inflows between 1998 and 2002 and the largest number of people was hence regularised in 2002.

**Table 5.5** *Results of regularisation processes in Southern Europe*

<i>Years</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Portugal</i>
1985-1990	322,626	34,832		-
1991-1995	244,492	109,135		39,166
1996-2000	217,124	221,748	370,000 (white card) 220,000 (green card)	35,082
2001-2007	634,728 (470,000) <sup>1</sup>	811,049		183,833 <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Number refers to the 'decree on flows' of 2006 that worked as a de facto or 'undeclared' regularisation of irregular immigrants who were already living in the country (Finotelli & Sciortino 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Data refer only to the 2001 regularisation, while data about the 2003 and 2004 regularisations and the 2007 ongoing process are very scarce.

Source: Own elaboration

Assessing the effects of regularisation processes is not a simple task, as there have not been enough empirical studies to provide an adequate answer. Nevertheless, some studies conducted in Italy and Spain uncovered some positive aspects. Given the restrictive and often inadequate effects of migration legislation, regularisations are likely to have allowed the legal inclusion and stabilisation of a large part of foreign residents, despite the inherent insecurity of the residence permits that were issued. Since 1986, 1.4 million immigrants received their residence permits through a regularisation process in Italy. According to Massimo Carfagna (2002) and Blangiardo (2004), the majority of immigrants regularised in Italy retained their legal status afterwards. Furthermore, it seems that the number of those who lost their residence permits and applied for several regularisation processes is rather insignificant. The case of Spain seems to be quite similar, as regularisations contributed to the inclusion of almost half of the foreign population (Arango & Finotelli 2009). Furthermore, recent studies carried out to assess the effects of regularisation processes in Spain demonstrate that such processes could serve to reduce the irregularity rate (Recaño & Domingo 2005; Pajares 2006; Cachón 2007; Cebolla & Gonzalez 2008; Arango & Finotelli 2009). There seem to be no analogous research results in Portugal and Greece. In Greece, however, the general assumption is that the number of reapplications in each process is rather high, since the legal status obtained in the various regularisations is lost rapidly.

Nevertheless, asserting that regularisations were able to 'stabilise' a large part of the foreign population in most Southern European countries does not mean they are a panacea against irregularity. All in all, regularisations do not substitute for an efficient immigration policy. They remain a regulation tool a posteriori, and there is no doubt that national governments cannot tackle the issue of irregular migration without seriously improving their migration policies. Real progress against irregularity can only be made if each national migration regime acts on the elements that factor heavily in the equation of irregularity. For this reason, both the Spanish and the Portuguese governments considered their most recent regularisations to be necessary and exceptional decisions to 'clean up the state' before carrying out wider legislative reforms of their migration regimes. In both countries, 'stigmatised' regularisation processes have been substituted by discrete and individual regularisation forms.<sup>13</sup> These important policy changes break with the mechanisms of the past and seem to be related to, among other factors, the improvement of the labour recruitment policies and control systems in recent years.

## 5.1 Admission and integration policies

### 5.5.1 *Labour migration policies*

During the first years of Southern European immigration history, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain developed a set of legislation more focused on administrative issues related to entry and residence than on the concept of effective regulatory instruments. The development and improvement of immigration laws of that type was one of the requirements that Greece, Portugal and Spain had to meet, like Italy at that time, for their European membership or prospects of membership in the EU. More sophisticated regulation and control mechanisms would mostly be enacted after the early 1990s, when massive inflows began to occur in some of these countries: first Italy and Greece, then Spain and Portugal.

The intensification of immigration flows, the awareness of an unmet demand for labour and the volume of irregular migration contributed to the development of several mechanisms of labour recruitment. As part of the broader objective of regulating the labour market, these mechanisms constituted an attempt to formulate an economic migration management policy that would allow for the legal admission of labour immigrants and the crackdown of irregular migration. As described above, these instruments paralleled the enactment of several regularisation schemes. Despite their tentative character and many failures, it can be argued that some of those policy initiatives were novel, especially in the EU context. In a sense, they were precursors of the EU's later statement on the need for immigration in the European economies. For example, it was only in 2000 that the then EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, António Vitorino, stated that 'the zero immigration policies of the past 25 years are not working', urging for 'new legal ways for immigrants to enter the EU' (quoted after Martin, Martin & Weil 2006: 74-75).

The legal channels of immigrants' labour recruitment differed across time and from country to country, though at least part of the rationale behind them could be considered similar. Whether they were invitation schemes, quota systems or shortage lists, they were designed to regulate future labour immigration and avoid the need for further regularisations. These systems were usually based on labour market needs (domestic skill and labour shortages) and on labour market tests (or checks), which gave preference to natives and other resident citizens to fill a job vacancy. As the recurrent increase of irregular immigration confirms, the regulating effect of these policies has been negligible.

When considered in detail in each Southern European country, the process of constructing labour admission policies is lengthy and cumbersome. In the early stages, a system of individual nomination or invitation of immigrants was coupled with the principle of labour market tests, whereby the native, the EU and the legal third-country nationals' resident workforce

would be protected and given priority in employment. In the mid-1980s, Spain was the first to introduce a labour recruitment procedure coupled with a labour market test system. The Foreigners Bill of 1985 allowed the hiring of migrants who submitted a nominal request to the general regime known as the *Regímen General*. However, the bureaucratic procedure to hire a migrant was very complex and most employers preferred employing their workers irregularly. In 1986, Italy also introduced a nominal request procedure and a labour market test system – neither of which was successful. The rule soon turned out to be too restrictive to deal with actual inflows. A system based on an invitation scheme known as *metaklisi* has been in place in Greece since 1991, and the requirement to protect local workers has also been enacted (Emke-Pouloupoulou 2007). This policy for labour migration, still in place today, is a rather complex one and its results have been far from initial expectations.

In a later stage, systems based on labour market quotas (or their equivalent) were common to all Southern countries. Italy (1990)<sup>14</sup> and Spain (1993) were the first to introduce this kind of system, followed by Greece (2001) and Portugal (2001). In Italy in 1990, a new law (Martelli law) introduced the principle of immigrant inflow control (the ‘intended number’, *numero programmato*) and, in 1995, a limited number of quotas was introduced. The Consolidation Act of 1998 on immigration and the status of foreigners (the Turco-Napolitano Law) and its amendment in 2002 improved the system. Every year, the Italian government, with one or more decrees, had to set the maximum quota of foreigners allowed to enter. The number was to be proportional to the needs of the Italian labour market (the necessary data was provided by the Ministry of Labour) and to the residence permits already issued for family reunification or for reasons of temporary social protection. The recruitment of foreign workers within this legal framework never worked properly. It was mainly used to regularise immigrants who were already living and working in the country.

In Spain in 1993, along with the system of nominal requests, the government introduced labour entry quotas known as *contingente*. The immigration quotas were published yearly by the Ministry of Labour, after consultations with the trade unions and employer associations. Again, the *contingente* never turned into an effective policy regulation instrument and came to be used to legalise irregular migrants already living in Spain. Other problems existed in the Spanish labour recruitment approach, such as poor communication between the central and the autonomic government (Aparicio & Roig 2006) and the fact that the *contingente* and the nominal request system constituted ‘blind’ recruitment tools that did not take into account that an employment relationship usually begins on the basis of trust and mutual knowledge.<sup>15</sup>

Greece and Portugal followed this ‘quota trend’ in 2001. The Greek Immigration Law of 2001 established an administrative procedure for the

issuing of stay permits for the purpose of employment, based on a plan crafted each year by the Organisation for the Employment of the Labour Force (OAED), which outlined the domestic labour market needs per sector and area. The system was improved in 2005, although the underlying principle was the same. Nevertheless, the main problem of the Greek approach lay in the *metaklisi* system, a procedure that remained extremely complex and time-consuming. In particular, long waiting periods are disadvantageous to small firms, which, more than other businesses, need quick and flexible entry policies.<sup>16</sup> In Portugal in 2001, a system of quotas for immigrant recruitment following a report on domestic labour shortages was also created. The number of visas was to match the job vacancies detected in various economic sectors (the quotas), according to a report drafted annually by the Institute of Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP). The system was a complex, bureaucratic and largely ineffective procedure and has not helped in the fight against irregular immigration.

Taking all these labour recruitment policies together, it is clear that their degree of restrictiveness and their complex administrative requirements were unfit for dealing with the high demand for labour and vast immigrant supply, and they were overall ineffective at regulating inflows and limiting irregular immigration. Given these constraints, regularisation policies often became a type of last resort for regulating the immigrants' insertion into the labour market.

Because of the inefficacy of these systems, some countries have profoundly changed their labour immigration policies in recent years in order to develop more efficient systems to meet the labour market needs. Spain is the most advanced country in this respect. In 2004, concurrent with the announcement of the large regularisation of 2005, the Spanish government approved a new Regulation Act to make the recruitment procedure of labour immigrants more flexible. The regulation re-established de facto the possibility of hiring foreign workers in their countries of origin through a nominal offer in the Regimen General. As in all immigration host countries, the employment of a foreign worker following these kinds of procedures still depends on a previously conducted labour market test. To make the recruitment easier, every three months the 'Catalogo de trabajos de dificil cobertura' ('Catalogue of hard-to-fill positions') is published, specifying the types of jobs for which there are usually no available candidates (be they Spanish citizens or from other EU countries). For these jobs, no labour market test is required. If an employer is looking to fill a vacancy listed in this catalogue, he or she can immediately begin the recruitment procedure.

The *contingente* remains another important admission channel in Spain. Furthermore, new regulations have introduced the 'entry visa for job search'. The purpose of this type of visa was to promote further flexibility within the recruiting procedures. However, the ability to apply for such a

visa was restricted to a limited number of sectors, such as the domestic sector. Very few visas have been issued for this purpose since the approval of the regulation. Finally, Spain is involved in a series of bilateral agreements with various sending countries, which are effective in providing long- or short-term workers to the Spanish labour market. However, the recent economic crisis affecting the country has not permitted a full testing of these measures.

#### 5.5.2 *Control policies*

Migration control policies developed quickly in the Southern European countries in reaction to relatively massive initial inflows into Italy and Greece (in the late 1980s and early 1990s), followed by Spain and Portugal (from the late 1990s onward). Border and internal control policies developed to at least some extent due to pressure from the EU, which insisted that Southern European countries should stop being an easy route for irregular migrants to travel into Northern and Western Europe. There are other, more substantive factors, however, that have largely shaped the practices and policies of migration control in the region. These include the geographical morphology of these countries, their strategic position on Mediterranean migration pathways (and Portugal on the Southern portion of the European Atlantic coast), the operation of smuggling networks, the countries' lack of previous immigration experience and their large informal economies, which provide abundant irregular employment opportunities for immigrants.

Moreover, all four countries are important tourism destinations, which make strict border controls more difficult to implement – especially during peak tourism seasons. At the same time, some of these countries' prospective immigrants (in Spain and Portugal in particular) are or have been exempted from visa requirements because of their Latin American or Lusophone origins. Finally, vast amounts of irregular migration take place throughout the Schengen space. For example, as seen above, many Eastern European immigrants cross the continent using Schengen tourist visas in order to get through the Pyrenees to Spain and Portugal. These facts make border enforcement very difficult in practical terms.

Adding to the difficulties of any border control mechanism, Southern European countries have long sea borders along the Mediterranean. Tiny islands like Lampedusa between Sicily and North Africa, the Greek islands of Chios and Lesbos in the Aegean Sea and the Canary Islands in the Atlantic have become hubs for dinghies and other types of illegal small boat traffic, caused by desperate irregular immigrants from Asia and Africa. Despite the sophisticated technological equipment being used by border control authorities, intercepting all such arrivals poses significant difficulties. The importance of these particular migratory phenomena has



been felt acutely since 2006, as there has been a dramatic and unexpected increase in irregular migrant arrivals from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia to the southern coasts of Europe.

The Canary Islands in the Atlantic, which are a part of Spanish territory, have long been a preferred target destination for thousands of irregular migrants sailing off the shores of Mauritania and Senegal for week-long journeys to Tenerife. Their numbers have fluctuated significantly, from 4,000 in 2001 to over 30,000 in 2006 (a so-called 'crisis year' for the Canary Islands-EU sea border) and falling again to approximately 12,000 in 2007 (Spanish Ministry of Interior data). During the same period (i.e. since 2000), the number of arrivals at the Strait of Gibraltar started at between 13,000 and 14,000 in the period 2001-2002, and then fell to half of that during the following years (thus fluctuating around 7,000 per year). The inversion of the trend at the Strait of Gibraltar is attributed mainly to the operation of the SIVE, the integrated border control system put in place by the Spanish government, as well as to the building of a militarised border around Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves in Morocco (Carling 2007).

The second most numerically significant destination in 2006 was the tiny island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily. Lampedusa receives between 15,000 and 20,000 irregular immigrants each year,<sup>17</sup> mainly sub-Saharan Africans setting off from the Libyan coast (and more recently from Algeria and Tunisia) aboard large fishing boats or other sea vessels. The relative success of sea border control by Italian authorities is well illustrated by the almost total cease in crossings of the Adriatic in the new century (Pastore et al. 2006).

Finally, the islands of the Aegean Sea near Greece are preferred target destinations for irregular Asian immigrants (Afghans, Iraqis, Syrians, etc.) who seek to enter Europe through Turkey. They cross the narrow straits from the Turkish mainland onto the islands of Mytilini (Lesvos), Rhodes, Samos, Chios, or even some smaller islands like Leros. The Greek coast-guard and police forces intercepted nearly 9,000 people in 2007 and over 15,000 persons in 2008.

Migration across the EU's southern sea borders is, in total numbers, relatively small. Adding up the numbers referred to previously, in 2007 approximately 50,000 irregular migrants crossed the border, in 2006 it was 45,000, and in 2005 it was under 30,000. Considering that the EU-27 are home to some 2.8 million to 6 million irregular migrants,<sup>18</sup> that the EU-15 (excluding Greece) received a total of 2.6 million legal immigrants in 2004 (according to OECD data) and that the EU-27 have a total population of 486.5 million, it becomes evident that this amount of irregular migration is only a tiny fraction of overall irregular flows and stocks. It is indeed a rather small number in the overall population of the EU as well as in the overall immigrant population of the EU. The nature of migration across

sea borders, however, imbues it with a sort of 'spectacular' news value: arrivals are dramatic, small boats sometimes capsize or sink near the shore and immigrants (including pregnant women and children) often die in their attempts to reach EU territory.<sup>19</sup>

Although the sea borders are a major concern for the Southern EU member states, the EU's external south-eastern land border is also a priority area. Land border controls mostly affect Greece and, to a lesser degree, Italy. The northern and north-eastern land borders have presented a major challenge to Greek migration control authorities since the early 1990s. Greece has been the target of irregular immigration flows because of its northern mountainous border with Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Italy experienced problems with the control of its border with Slovenia during the 1990s, including both irregular migration control and the management of visas (citizens of the former Yugoslavia or Albania would go to Slovenia and apply there for a visa to enter Italy as tourists). Nevertheless, land borders cannot be said to present too major a challenge for the Southern European countries, as they have largely internal EU borders and thus, increasingly, no borders at all (because of their participation in the Schengen no-internal-border area).

With regard to internal controls, all four Southern European countries have practised random public controls in efforts to stem irregular migration. In Greece, these controls were particularly frequent during the 1990s, and targeted mostly Albanian immigrants. In the early to mid-1990s, massive deportations – mainly of Albanian citizens – became common police practice. However, internal control policies in recent years have given more emphasis to actions targeting informal work. In Spain, since the regularisation of 2005, state authorities have prioritised labour inspections as a means of combating irregular migration. Spain's strategy has been three-pronged: border management has improved, irregular migrants who live in the country have been given the opportunity to legalise their stay and work and labour market inspections have been intensified. In Greece, Italy and Portugal, plans are in place to better control the informal economy and combat informal work, in general, but labour inspection mechanisms remain under-resourced and, to a certain extent, ineffective (Maroukis 2009; Pastore 2008). Moreover, in all four countries, dominant work areas like domestic services (cleaning and caring for families) are – by their very nature – hard to control and, as a result, it is improbable that informal work control policies can effectively regulate these sectors through labour inspections.

Finally, external control policies have been increasingly focused on cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries. Readmission agreements have been signed between Greece and Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey (Protocol of Readmission), and there are local cooperation agreements on the Greek-Macedonian (FYROM) border. Spain and Italy have signed

readmission and mutual cooperation agreements with several countries, including Morocco (Spain), Albania and Tunisia (Italy). The implementation of the Protocol of Readmission between Greece and Turkey is far from satisfactory, but Moroccan, Albanian and Tunisian authorities have been more cooperative.

Overall, the approach to enforcement of external controls has changed since the 1990s. Southern European countries do not seek to protect their borders from the inside – or rather not only from the inside. They aim to act in concert with major neighbouring sending or transit countries, providing programmes of seasonal migration and development aid in exchange.

In sum, there seems to be limited purposeful coordination between external and internal border controls as well as within the overall policy for managing migration flows and stocks. Border control efforts have been increasing throughout recent years, despite the fact that, within the last ten years, all these countries have enacted more than one large regularisation programme. While government authorities are aware that migration cannot be stopped as long as dramatic socio-economic inequalities persist between sending and receiving countries, they do not have an effective plan for managing migration. Their control policies appear to be, to a certain extent, detached from regularisation, management and integration policies, indeed seeking to accomplish a Sisyphean task.

### 5.5.3 *Integration and citizenship policies*

All the Southern European countries developed their integration policies in response to the arrival and settlement of relatively large numbers of migrants in a relatively short period of time. Although it is an exaggeration to claim that they are still ‘new’ host countries – since their experience dates back to the early 1990s – it is also important to note that migration to Southern Europe took place in the post-Cold War era, largely without planning and without a legal framework. Migrants did not arrive at a period of the manufacturing industry’s expansion – they found jobs mainly in the service sector and, in particular, in the secondary labour market, notably at jobs that were underpaid and of low prestige and precarious conditions. These general socio-economic conditions framed the process of immigrant integration and the policies of integration that Southern European countries have since developed.<sup>20</sup>

Italy, the first Southern country to experience significant immigration in the late 1980s, developed its first integrated migration policy, which included issues of immigrant integration and political participation, in 1998. Greece and Portugal crafted their first comprehensive immigration laws including the issues of integration in 2001, and Spain did so in 2000.<sup>21</sup> During this last decade, all four countries have developed a set of

integration policies tackling the issues of health, housing, education and socio-economic assistance to migrants.

There are important differences between the four countries as regards the public administration structures that manage welfare policies. In Spain and Italy, these policies apply to regions (*Comunidades Autonomas* in Spain) and municipalities, and there are hence different policies and practices in different regions. In Spain, migrants are concentrated in the two largest cities (Barcelona and Madrid), in the regions along the Mediterranean coast and in the two archipelagos. The regional and municipal authorities in the respective regions have, over time, developed plans for the social integration of migrants, and their social services have responded to the needs of these new populations as well. In Italy, too, regions with large immigrant populations in the north, north-east and in the centre are known for providing welfare assistance to legal migrants and their families, including housing, welfare allowances and other services (see Zincone 2000a, 2000b).

In Greece and Portugal, the national plans for integration are administered in a more centralised way than in Spain and Italy. In Greece, these plans for integration have often suffered from partial implementation and a lack of continuity. In Portugal, the early creation of the ACIME, later renamed ACIDI,<sup>22</sup> guaranteed some continuity within the policies and improved immigrants' integration prospects. This institution's role was to act as a go-between, facilitating communication between the government and immigrants and ensuring that the latter's rights were respected and their needs attended to. According to several sources, the role of ACIDI in structuring the civic sphere for migrant representation and participation and promoting socio-economic integration policies at the local and national level has been crucial (Teixeira & Albuquerque 2005; see also Niessen, Huddleston, Citron, Geddes & Jacobs 2007).<sup>23</sup>

In all four countries, EU initiatives and European Social Fund programmes have been valuable and given opportunity to immigrant organisations and other NGOs, as well as municipalities and universities, to promote the social and economic integration of immigrants. Indeed, European Social Fund programmes and the more recent European Integration Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals have been instrumental in creating synergies, mobilising resources, even reorganising public administration offices, all with a view to providing services to migrant communities. On the whole, the outcome of these programmes has been positive, although their structural effect on the socio-economic integration of foreigners is limited. As seen in a previous section, migrants in Southern Europe mostly take on jobs in lower segments of the labour market. Moreover, they remain largely in poor housing and are often the targets of negative stereotyping by the media (King, Lazaridis & Tsardanidis 2000; Ribas-Mateos 2004).

With regard to citizenship policies, Southern European countries have generally restrictive approaches. In Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal, until 2006 third-country nationals had to reside in the country for at least ten years in order to apply for naturalisation (six years now in Portugal; two years in Spain for some nationalities). In Italy and Greece, citizenship policies have been applied in a restrictive manner, leading to very low numbers of naturalised citizens (about 11,000 cases per year in Italy, mainly as a result of marriage to an Italian citizen, and about 50 cases a year in Greece). In the latter, applications from citizens of neighbouring countries have routinely been rejected during the past two decades, even when applicants satisfied all the requirements for naturalisation and even when they were married to a Greek citizen.

Naturalisation laws in all four countries are often contingent on ethnic descent. Naturalisation is easy if one has Greek, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian ancestors even two generations back (i.e. in a grandparent). By contrast, legally residing immigrants find it much harder to become naturalised even after ten years of residence. In most countries, preference is given to people who are of the same ethnic descent (Greece) or who can prove ancestry, as well as to individuals who come from former colonies (Latin American countries for Spain and Luso-speaking countries for Portugal).<sup>24</sup>

As regards the second generation, provisions vary. They are on the whole more generous than naturalisation policies in three out of the four countries (with the exception of Greece). However, second-generation provisions in Southern Europe fall short of becoming effective integration mechanisms for the children of immigrants. They often seem to perpetuate the distinction between 'native' and 'foreigner', without taking into account that children born in a country or who arrived at pre-school age in that country have completed all their education and have been socialised into the local and national norms and habits. It is thus questionable to treat them as foreigners.

All of these elements considered, the process of immigrant integration in Southern European host countries has taken place mainly through labour market insertion and at the personal or family level, through informal and personalised social networks, and with the help of third sector organisations. In other words, this slow process of piecemeal integration has had less to do with formal integration policies in these countries and related state structures, including welfare services, education services and other social agencies – Portugal being a partial exception. Although the importance of integration policies is not to be underestimated, a situation exists in Southern Europe whereby immigrants find their local niches in life and work, initially even without papers, and quickly adopt (or are forced to adopt) the local customs and, through personal relations with natives, manage to take part in the local networks of clientelistic relations. These networks generally structure both the labour market (e.g. the process of

finding employment or improving one's work position) and interaction with the state in Southern Europe. The role of immigrants' associations and other NGOs, including ones linked to the Catholic Church, has also helped in the process. Immigrants' lives are of course made easier when appropriate integration policies (such as access to housing, health care, schooling) are provided in their cities and towns of residence.

Generally speaking, Southern European countries have developed a reactive, rather than proactive, framework for immigrant integration. Policies and practices have been more developed at the regional and local levels than the national level. The third sector, mostly involving immigrant associations and NGOs, has played an important part in assisting immigrants and integrating them in their chosen societies of settlement. However, formal policies of integration, including those for overall social and political integration and citizenship acquisition, have, to date, exhibited significant deficits that need to be addressed in the near future.

## 5.6 General considerations and concluding remarks

This comparative study of the Southern European countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – and their immigration experiences confirms the existence of numerous similarities within this framework, which counterbalance the role of significant differences; a set of common explanatory factors; and a similar position within the broader context of the European migration system (see chapters 1 and 2 in this volume). As suggested in the initial chapters of this volume, there are reasons to believe that Southern Europe is the most homogeneous context regarding migration flows within Europe. The more relevant similarities and explaining factors are the following.

First, the evolution of migration flows has been quite similar in all four countries. Each one has had important emigration experiences to date. During the 1970s and 1980s, the migration transition took place. Emigration decreased, return migration increased (only to decline later) and foreign immigration rose as well. Over a short period of time, these countries went from net emigration to net immigration – though the timing and rhythm of inflows were not identical. Foreign immigration was manifest in all these countries during the 1980s, but the bulk of the movements varied, depending mostly on contextual factors. In Greece, most of the inflows occurred during the 1990s; in Italy and Portugal, during the early 2000s; and in Spain, throughout the new century until the recent economic recession. At the same time, emigration has not ceased completely. The most exceptional case is that of Portugal, where immigration decreased and emigration resumed in the first decade of the new century, almost reversing the previous migration balance. There is thus certainly an identifiable, long-term

transition process that brings countries from situations of net emigration to net immigration in Southern Europe. However, as the volatility of inflows and the particular case of Portugal may confirm, any model of migration evolution with linearity prevailing – the best example of which being the ‘mobility transition’ model (Zelinsky 1971)<sup>25</sup> – would be both inaccurate and imprudent. A theory based on a rigid sequence of migration stages (see chapter 1 in this volume) thus warrants further scrutiny.

Second, despite a considerable variation in the national origin of immigrants, their demographic characteristics are very similar. Most inflows have comprised young adults who either directly targeted the labour market or came within the framework of family reunion (although many of the latter also inserted themselves rapidly in the labour market). This demographic profile explains why the immigrants’ offspring are only now becoming visible. The most significant exception to this age profile – although not exceedingly significant, in relative terms – is the case of retirement migration coming mainly into Spain and Portugal from developed EU countries. In terms of gender, immigration is, in general, balanced – although some imbalances emerge upon closer inspection of certain flows and certain nationalities.

Third, the labour market insertion of immigrants exhibits many commonalities. In all four countries, both male and female immigrants have high employment rates – a fact that confirms the labour-oriented nature of most inflows. Immigrants are mostly concentrated in the same economic sectors: construction, manufacturing (mainly in Italy), hotels and restaurants, retail trade, domestic work and agriculture (except in Portugal). In many of these sectors, immigrants benefit from the seasonal nature of some activities – namely, tourism and agriculture. Data analyses confirm that newly arrived migrants are mainly absorbed into the least protected segments of the labour market, those that are normally rejected by natives. Migrants are also often overqualified for the jobs they perform, due to their relatively high educational backgrounds. Finally, they are commonly overexposed to precarious labour arrangements, including temporary contracts and unemployment risks.

Fourth, migration policies exhibit some similarities in terms of their general evolution and objectives, but many differences also result from differing institutional contexts. The core resemblances are attributable to the similar path adopted by most of their policy approaches. All four countries first began to deal with administrative norms related to the entry and residence of foreigners, mainly as a result of EU accession requirements in the cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain. They then sought stricter controls and rigorous enforcement when inflows began to increase. Over time, they devised ways to manage labour migration, especially when immigration became widespread, and used procedures that varied from invitation schemes to labour quotas. In later stages, they developed approaches to

integration, whether at the national, regional or local level. And finally, in every case, the Southern European countries sporadically engaged in regularisation processes in order to regulate *ex post* what they were unable to regulate *ex ante*. The timing and concrete expression of these policy initiatives were, however, very different from country to country, and reveal specific institutional structures and a particular political context.

Fifth, integration outcomes are generally limited, although prospects vary from case to case. Substantial evidence confirms that, aside from rapid insertion into the labour market, much needs to be done in order to achieve successful integration. The labour insertion process itself is also confined to the least protected and least desired segments of the labour market, leading to what may be termed a situation of structural exclusion (Calavita 2005). However, increases in the duration of stays (many immigrants face harsh working conditions in earlier stages, only to later enjoy upward mobility (Chiswick 1978)), insertion into social networks (either of fellow foreign citizens, other foreigners or of nationals) and support from third sector organisations and other sources of political assistance have led and may continue to lead to situational improvement.

The questions to be asked are as follows: Why have all these processes evolved like this, and why did similarities arise so frequently among the Southern European countries? Moreover, why does the immigration experience in Southern Europe differ so markedly from the one of the 'old' European host countries? A set of explanatory variables can thus be added into the discussion.

The first factor has to do with the timing of inflows. Despite differences in rhythm and the inherent non-linearity of the migration process, it can be argued that all Southern European countries bear the same historical imprint in their immigration experience. To use other terminology, they are affected by the same 'generation effect' (see chapter 2 in this volume). They all have witnessed periods of strong immigration growth and have had to deal with their outcomes after the 1980s – a period characterised by deindustrialisation, liberalisation of the labour markets and deregulation of all advanced economies. This means that the regulation of migration – i.e. the enactment of effective recruitment and control policies – and the prevention of integration deficits would always be of utmost difficulty, as recent immigration trends within many other global contexts confirm.

The second factor is related to the migration cycle. In all Southern European cases, immigration flows are relatively recent and display a similar demographic pattern. Most of the inflows comprise young adults. Only now are the immigrants' offspring beginning to be statistically significant, either by means of '1.5 generation' immigrants (children who arrived early in their lives) or second-generation immigrants (children born in the host countries). In this way, Southern European countries are all affected by the same 'age effect' (see chapter 2 in this volume). The impacts of immigrants



on the welfare system are still generally positive (they are net contributors, since they are mostly absorbed into the labour force, but this may change in the future) and the integration-related issues that pertain to second-generation immigrants are only now coming to the fore (and they will ultimately challenge the prospects for integration).

The third factor is labour demand. In all Southern European countries, low fertility and demographic ageing are responsible for a shortage of labour force, leading to diminishing emigration and increasing immigration (see chapter 1 in this volume). Moreover, a vast labour-intensive economic sector exists in these countries: it is sometimes linked to traditional activities or to new types of demand. This is the case of agriculture, construction, some manufacturing industries, hotels and restaurants (often related to tourism) and domestic work. In all these sectors, foreign manpower substitutes for native manpower – as is exemplified by the case of domestic work, a sector which has long been in existence, but which is now affected by a decreasing native labour supply. During recent decades, job creation in these sectors was vast, a phenomenon due to the high rates of economic growth during part of this period. The strong labour demand for immigrants is also related, in many ways, to the extent of the informal economy. Although informal arrangements are now part and parcel of all advanced economies, comparative studies show that Southern European countries are among those with higher levels of informality. This is a key contextual consideration to be made in explaining the endemic presence of irregular immigrants.

The fourth factor results from socio-economic structures or regimes (see chapter 2). One of the main variables is the type of welfare state. Although there is no consensus about what a ‘Southern European’ type of welfare entails, there are a number of commonalities. The ‘conservative model’ adopted by some authors (Esping-Andersen 1990; Sciortino 2004) attributes many welfare obligations directly to families, does not include the direct provision of all welfare services (using instead the principle of monetary transfers to the households) and protects the already employed extensively. The ‘Southern European model’ adopted by other authors (Ferrera 1996) stresses the importance of private-public partnerships and clientelism. All these traits, some of which are not specific to these countries, help explain the demand for immigration in some sectors (for example, given the rapid demographic ageing, caring for the elderly within the household is a fast-growing immigration recruitment sector) and the segmentation of the labour market (leading to the co-existence of protected and non-protected segments). If we add to all this the difficulties faced by law enforcement in Southern European states, we can also explain the widespread acceptance of informal and irregular situations that are common to natives and foreigners alike.

Another important element of the socio-economic regimes is the organisation of civil society. Again, this helps explain some immigration and policy trends. The growing presence of women in the labour market explains part of the immigrant recruitment trends for the domestic and care sector. Increased levels of education and, more generally, social expectations among the domestic youth explain their shunning of the bottom sectors of the labour market. The work of several NGOs demonstrates the support given to immigrants and the improvement of their integration prospects, even in the absence of adequate governmental policies. The importance of the Catholic Church in all countries, but Greece also, demonstrates the strength of the pro-immigrant coalition. The presence of active trade unions is a relevant variable, since it is directly related to the co-existence of well-protected sectors of the labour force and the comparatively less protected 'immigration jobs' (although unions have sometimes played a dual role, as they also have campaigned for immigrants' rights). The power of individual employers and employers' organisations explains the frequent use of irregular workforce, labour exploitation and lobbying for pro-immigration policies. All these elements are linked to the modes of immigrants' incorporation into society and, also, to the making of immigration policies (Zincone 2006). Last but not least, integration into the EU is an obvious factor directly constraining national immigration policies.

The fifth factor involves the dominant public perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants. Here again some similarities arise between the Southern countries, although differences seem to prevail. The importance of this factor is linked to the practical acceptance of immigrants in daily life, which affects their integration prospects, as well as to the role of political parties, which often makes immigration a decisive politicised element in modern democracies. Public opinion seems generally divided in Southern European countries. Some indicators confirm the public acceptance of immigration, while others suggest fear and concern. Past colonial and historical links, specific languages and culture, and various stereotypes add to the complexity already inherent in this field, making it impossible to generalise the situations of different countries and immigrant groups. All in all, perceptions and attitudes constitute a dependent and an independent variable – as occurs with other factors mentioned earlier. They evolve in a dynamic way, affecting and being affected by other variables.

In sum, it can be argued that a Southern European model of immigration does exist, as was supported by research during the 1990s and early 2000s (see e.g. King 2000). This model encompasses many similar traits, factors and outcomes, although specific national frameworks make a difference. Looking at the national level, for example, the various timings and characteristics of inflows have been accompanied by various timings and characteristics of immigration policies. A point that must be stressed is that this model is dynamic in the sense that new dimensions are continuously

arising (for example, the second generation), new social frameworks are built (for example, evolving social attitudes) and new policies are enacted. An issue that merits further investigation is the effect of the current economic recession on migration trends (Martin 2009). It is well known that previous recessions have reshaped the world map of migration, and unexpected outcomes could now arise in the Southern European context. Another issue deserving scrutiny is the possibility of this model being enlarged to other newly expanding economies in Europe, such as Ireland and Finland (as well as other Southern European countries, including Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia (see King & Thomson 2008)).

Compared to the other groups of immigration countries examined in this book, the Southern European experience seems to be rather different from the 'old' immigration countries. The timing of inflows, the position in the migration cycle, the level and type of labour demand, the socio-economic structures, the public perception and the immigration policies are all significantly different in those contexts. Among other consequences, these differences seem to limit the prospects for a common policy approach, including a common EU policy – despite the long-term accumulated efforts in this direction (see chapters 11 and 12 in this volume). However, it may be argued that part of the framework in which immigration took place in the South is similar to the one involving the 'recent' or 'future' immigration countries in CEE. This is the case, for example, of the new type of inflows in the globalisation era and the overall trend for deregulation. In this sense, some traits of the Southern experience may replicate to the East, adding to the overall constraints that result from a common EU membership.

Notwithstanding national and contextual singularities, immigration has always constituted a major source of social change in Europe. This was also the case of Southern Europe. In recent years immigrants, native populations, civil society and governments have struggled to adapt to a new environment, which is now structural and will influence many years to come. Immigration became part and parcel of Southern European societies. While immigrants struggled to make a living in this new environment, local populations and institutions sought a way of dealing with immigration and its consequences. In a sense, it was not only immigrants who were looking for Southern Europe. It was also Southern Europe looking for itself.

## Notes

- 1 This chapter results from the work carried out by the IDEA Southern European research teams in 2007 through 2009. The group benefited from the overall discussions of the project, intended to provide a comparison between North-Western, Southern and Central and Eastern European immigration experiences. Further work

was based on a detailed comparison between the Southern cases, which culminated in a workshop held in Lisbon in January 2009, where the first version of the current chapter was discussed. Most of the source information and further details about each country may be found in the national country reports elaborated during the project: Triandafyllidou and Maroufouf (2009) for Greece; Bonifazi, Heins, Strozza and Vitiello (2009) for Italy; Sabino and Peixoto (2009) for Portugal; Arango and Finotelli (2009) for Spain. Most of the work was carried out before the advent of the global economic crisis in 2008.

- 2 The purpose of Russell King and Mark Thomson (2008) is to enlarge the scope of the analysis to other Southern European countries, namely, Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia.
- 3 The Fordist type of capitalism refers to the period characterised by mass production and mass consumption that predominated in Western economies between the end of World War II and the oil crisis of the mid-1970s. This period was characterised by high rates of economic growth, mostly due to the manufacturing industry, stable labour relations and state intervention in the welfare domain.
- 4 For the main sources on international migration in Southern Europe, see Cangiano and Strozza (2008).
- 5 Estimates of total foreign population, including the illegal component, are reported in some cases.
- 6 Most of the immigrants came from the former colonies in Africa (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, PALOP) and from Brazil.
- 7 Recent research on this phenomenon demonstrated that countries like Germany, whose governmental authorities often denied the existence of irregular migration in their country, have also had to deal with a certain degree of irregular migration (Alt 1999; Schönwälder, Vogel & Sciortino 2004).
- 8 The data used for this estimate did not take into account the 'deputation' process of the municipal register and might contain a certain degree of overestimation.
- 9 The Schengen Agreement became operative in 1995 in Spain and Portugal and only in 1998 in Italy and Greece.
- 10 Estimates indicate that since 1973 Western European countries have regularised about 4 million immigrants, 3 million of them in Southern European countries (Papadopoulou 2005; MPG/Weil 2004).
- 11 In 2005, the German and the Dutch governments, for instance, sharply criticised the Spanish regularisation, fearing an 'invasion' of regularised immigrants from Spain to other European countries and blaming the Spanish government for not having informed the other EU member states in time about the process.
- 12 In Italy, we should add to the mentioned processes the special flows decree approved in 2006, which enlarged the quota for 2006 up to the number of applications received. The rationale behind this decision was a belief that most applications had been filed for workers already living irregularly in Italy, so that the increase of the contingent would work as a de facto regularisation programme. In Portugal, legislation approved in 2007 also allowed a special type of regularisation scheme, this time based on an ongoing individual approach.
- 13 The Spanish Regulation Act of 2004 assumes the risk of a certain volume of irregular migration, introducing the *arraigo*, which is an individual regularisation and an ongoing regularisation system. The Portuguese immigration law of 2007 contains some mechanisms allowing the legalisation of formerly irregular situations. These include, among others, stable labour activity and social integration indicators, such as the attendance of basic education by children of immigrants already born in the country.

- 14 The principle was set in 1990, although quotas would only be defined in 1995 and enforced in 1998.
- 15 This aspect is even more important in the case of domestic service, where trust is an essential condition for employment.
- 16 The agricultural sector seems to represent an exception.
- 17 Nearly 16,000 irregular migrants were apprehended upon arrival in Lampedusa in 2006. There were approximately 23,000 such arrivals during the first eight months of 2008, while numbers seemed to rise in early 2009 as 2,120 people were intercepted during the first two months of 2009, compared to 1,650 during the first two months of 2008.
- 18 This estimate is provided by the CLANDESTINO research project database, published on 20 February 2009 at <http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/category/clandestino-database-on-irregular-migration>.
- 19 Both media attention to irregular arrivals by sea and the rising numbers of such arrivals have led to the more active involvement of the FRONTEX agency in the patrolling of the southern EU borders. Following the European Council Meeting on 14-15 December 2006, FRONTEX, together with member states in the region, was invited to, as soon as possible, establish a permanent Coastal Patrol Network at their southern maritime borders.
- 20 The following paragraphs only describe integration policies, not integration outcomes. For a comprehensive view of immigrant integration patterns in Southern Europe, see e.g. King, Lazaridis and Tsardanidis (2000) and VV.AA. (2004).
- 21 The first national integration plan in Spain dates back to 1994. It was, however, barely effective.
- 22 The High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities was a governmental position created in 1996. It was the basis for the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME) in 2002, which in 2007 was designated as the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI).
- 23 [www.integrationindex.eu](http://www.integrationindex.eu).
- 24 The situation in Spain and Portugal is complex, since the law combines some traits of restrictiveness and permissiveness. In Spain, the application for citizenship for Latin Americans is possible after two years of legal residence. However, the two-year criterion is not clearly related to ethnic descent: besides Latin America, citizens from Portugal, Andorra, the Philippines and Equatorial Guinea may also apply after two years. In Portugal, the law was modified in 2006, easing the residence constraints for acquiring Portuguese citizenship by naturalisation and granting the same rights to citizens coming from Portuguese-speaking and other countries. This has produced notable results, since the number of valid requirements to get citizenship almost quadrupled between 2007 and 2008, increasing from approximately 9,000 to 35,000.
- 25 Referred to in the Introduction of this volume.

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