An IPV Auction Model for Strategic Bidding Analysis under Incomplete and Asymmetric Information

In the competitive electricity markets, information plays a major role; different distributions of information among the market players may impact the market outcomes in terms of prices and surpluses. In this paper we present a model based on the Independent Private Value auction theory to analyze the strategic interaction among producers in the electricity market and its outcomes in different informative contexts. The model is based on a game theory application in which we define a static and simultaneous game with incomplete and asymmetric information. The day-ahead electricity market is considered as a multi-object auction in which each producer owns a multi-plant firm and offers multiple couples of price-power quantities. The model is used to study the market outcomes of different distributions of information levels among the players in markets characterized by the presence of a dominant producer. Numerical examples are provided with reference to the Italian electricity market to illustrate some of the salient market outcomes.