This paper outlines the basics of a formal theory of belief that is sensitive to the way in which beliefs are formed through perception. The process of formation of beliefs involves a form of inference that is defeasible. We represent this kind of inference by means of well-known techniques of non-monotonic reasoning. In addition, we provide an account of perception that is consistent with the commonsense intuition for how perception functions, i.e., causality.
Acquisition of beliefs though perception
Musto D.;
1993
Abstract
This paper outlines the basics of a formal theory of belief that is sensitive to the way in which beliefs are formed through perception. The process of formation of beliefs involves a form of inference that is defeasible. We represent this kind of inference by means of well-known techniques of non-monotonic reasoning. In addition, we provide an account of perception that is consistent with the commonsense intuition for how perception functions, i.e., causality.File in questo prodotto:
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