A Game Theoretical study of Peering vs Transit in the Internet

We propose a model for network optimization in a non-cooperative game setting with specific reference to the Internet connectivity. We refer to the general model shown in internal report In where Autonomous Systems (AS) decisions on link creation and traffic routing are strategically based on realistic interconnection costs, keeping into account the peering/transit dichotomy. Equilibria existence and convergence results were obtained in Ill only for a specific toy problem, while here we study larger scale scenarios which better fit the complex nature of the Internet. We are able to show that equilibria existence and convergence properties still hold for many possible generalizations, yet not all of them, and provide a specific example for which the system enters in a never-ending oscillation. Thanks to the use of simulations we covered those scenarios for which analytic results could not be obtained, thus analyzing a broad variety of general cases which were not studied in In Simulation shows that the system, in the vast majority of cases, converges to an equilibrium. Very interestingly, even in asymmetric scenarios the equilibrium reached suggests that players tend to be symmetric with respect to the peering exchange points and send their asymmetric traffic quota via the transit service providers.