Abstract. Reasoning about causation in fact is an essential element of attributing legal responsibility. Therefore, the automation of the attri- bution of legal responsibility requires a modelling e®ort aimed at the following: a thorough understanding of the relation between the legal concepts of responsibility and of causation in fact; a thorough under- standing of the relation between causation in fact and the common sense concept of causation; and, finally, the specification of an ontology of the concepts that are minimally required for (automatic) common sense rea- soning about causation. This article o®ers a worked out example of the indicated analysis, which comprises: a definition of the legal concept of responsibility; a definition of the legal concept of causation in fact; CausatiOnt, an AI-like ontology of the common sense (causal) concepts that are minimally needed for reasoning about the legal concept of causation in fact.

CAUSATIONT: Modeling Causation in AI&Law

2005

Abstract

Abstract. Reasoning about causation in fact is an essential element of attributing legal responsibility. Therefore, the automation of the attri- bution of legal responsibility requires a modelling e®ort aimed at the following: a thorough understanding of the relation between the legal concepts of responsibility and of causation in fact; a thorough under- standing of the relation between causation in fact and the common sense concept of causation; and, finally, the specification of an ontology of the concepts that are minimally required for (automatic) common sense rea- soning about causation. This article o®ers a worked out example of the indicated analysis, which comprises: a definition of the legal concept of responsibility; a definition of the legal concept of causation in fact; CausatiOnt, an AI-like ontology of the common sense (causal) concepts that are minimally needed for reasoning about the legal concept of causation in fact.
2005
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione - ISTC
Applied Legal Ontology
Artificial Intelligence and Law
Causal Relations
Philosophy
Legal Theory
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14243/29144
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