The paper focuses on the determinants of the contract of corruption which sees the contraposition of a public official and a private agent. The main idea is that the allocation of bargaining power between the bureaucrat and the private individual determines the emergence of two different types of contracts. Active corruption emerges when the bargaining power is in the hands of bureaucrat. Passive corruption when it is in the hands of firm. This leads in turn to different levels of bribes. The theory is put at a test with Italian data on corruption. The data tend to confirm theory's predictions.
The determinat of the contract of corruption: thoery and evidence
Salvatore Capasso;Lodovico Santoro
2014
Abstract
The paper focuses on the determinants of the contract of corruption which sees the contraposition of a public official and a private agent. The main idea is that the allocation of bargaining power between the bureaucrat and the private individual determines the emergence of two different types of contracts. Active corruption emerges when the bargaining power is in the hands of bureaucrat. Passive corruption when it is in the hands of firm. This leads in turn to different levels of bribes. The theory is put at a test with Italian data on corruption. The data tend to confirm theory's predictions.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
