Government managers play a central role in the public administration of countries to support their overall efficiency. The compensation of central government senior managers has received considerable attention in recent years since it has risen in many countries. The public, the media and academia see government senior managers as being overpaid, with salaries increasing in a disproportionate and inequitable way. The literature has analyzed some possible determinants of this socio-administrative issue. However, the political and institutional factors affecting public managers' compensation are still largely unknown. This study shows that the average compensation of central government senior managers in some OECD countries seems to be positively associated with the average salary of members of parliament (MPs). Furthermore, high compensation of public managers seems to be more frequent in countries with low freedom of expression, of association and of the media, as well as low quality of contract enforcement, property rights and control of corruption. These results may provide fruitful insights into the possible causes of this relation, to support reforms and best practices which can improve the efficiency of the public administration in modern economies.
I dirigenti governativi svolgono un ruolo centrale nella pubblica amministrazione dei paesi per sostenere la loro efficienza complessiva. La compensazione degli alti dirigenti del governo centrale ha ricevuto notevole attenzione negli ultimi anni da quando è cresciuta in molti paesi. Il pubblico, i media e il mondo accademico, vedono i dirigenti governativi come sovraccarichi, con salari crescenti in modo sproporzionato e ingiusto. La letteratura ha analizzato alcune possibili determinanti di questo tema socio-amministrativo. Tuttavia, i fattori politici e istituzionali che incidono sul risarcimento dei dirigenti pubblici sono ancora in gran parte sconosciuti. Questo studio dimostra che la compensazione media dei dirigenti del governo centrale in alcuni paesi dell'OCSE sembra essere associata positivamente allo stipendio medio dei deputati (parlamentari). Inoltre, l'elevata remunerazione dei dirigenti pubblici sembra essere più frequente nei Paesi con scarsa libertà di espressione, associazione e media, nonché di scarsa qualità dell'applicazione del contratto, dei diritti di proprietà e del controllo della corruzione. Questi risultati potrebbero fornire una profonda conoscenza delle possibili cause di questa relazione, sostenere le riforme e le migliori pratiche che possono migliorare l'efficienza della pubblica amministrazione nelle economie moderne.
General Trends and Causes of High Compensation of Government Managers in the OECD Countries
2017
Abstract
Government managers play a central role in the public administration of countries to support their overall efficiency. The compensation of central government senior managers has received considerable attention in recent years since it has risen in many countries. The public, the media and academia see government senior managers as being overpaid, with salaries increasing in a disproportionate and inequitable way. The literature has analyzed some possible determinants of this socio-administrative issue. However, the political and institutional factors affecting public managers' compensation are still largely unknown. This study shows that the average compensation of central government senior managers in some OECD countries seems to be positively associated with the average salary of members of parliament (MPs). Furthermore, high compensation of public managers seems to be more frequent in countries with low freedom of expression, of association and of the media, as well as low quality of contract enforcement, property rights and control of corruption. These results may provide fruitful insights into the possible causes of this relation, to support reforms and best practices which can improve the efficiency of the public administration in modern economies.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


