In this paper, a class of bimatrix games having the same Nash equilibria of a given game, either in pure or in mixed policies, is characterized. Such a goal is reached by computing the set of all the polynomials that are monotone strictly increasing in a given interval and by borrowing techniques from algebraic geometry to find solutions to a set of polynomial equalities.
An Algebraic Geometry Approach to Compute Strategically Equivalent Bimatrix Games
Possieri Corrado;
2017
Abstract
In this paper, a class of bimatrix games having the same Nash equilibria of a given game, either in pure or in mixed policies, is characterized. Such a goal is reached by computing the set of all the polynomials that are monotone strictly increasing in a given interval and by borrowing techniques from algebraic geometry to find solutions to a set of polynomial equalities.File in questo prodotto:
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