The "modcl-preference" account of default reasoning recently proposed by Selman and Kautz overcomes some limitations of previous default formalisms, as it has a strong model-theoretic flavour and provides a formai justification for the limited cognitive load that default reasoning seems to require of human beings. In this paper we describe L{'])T), a non-standard proof system for model-preference default reasoning; L{'])T) is non-standard in the sense that rules have a global character, and that it deals with proofs of the minimality of knowledge bases rather than with proofs of the theorcmhood of formulae. Nonethelcss, L{'])T) retains the essential character of a proof system, namely, the independence of provability from the order of application of the rules.

A proof-theoretic account of model-preference default reasoning

Sebastiani F
1990

Abstract

The "modcl-preference" account of default reasoning recently proposed by Selman and Kautz overcomes some limitations of previous default formalisms, as it has a strong model-theoretic flavour and provides a formai justification for the limited cognitive load that default reasoning seems to require of human beings. In this paper we describe L{'])T), a non-standard proof system for model-preference default reasoning; L{'])T) is non-standard in the sense that rules have a global character, and that it deals with proofs of the minimality of knowledge bases rather than with proofs of the theorcmhood of formulae. Nonethelcss, L{'])T) retains the essential character of a proof system, namely, the independence of provability from the order of application of the rules.
1990
Istituto di Scienza e Tecnologie dell'Informazione "Alessandro Faedo" - ISTI
978-0-444-88771-9
Default reasoning
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
prod_452753-doc_170623.pdf

non disponibili

Descrizione: A proof-theoretic account of model-preference default reasoning
Tipologia: Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Dimensione 1.09 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.09 MB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14243/399916
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact