We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely-held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion and over-investment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE’s investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and over-investment. JEL: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.

Does a switch of budget regimes affect investment and managerial discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian firms

Rondi L
2002

Abstract

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely-held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion and over-investment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE’s investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and over-investment. JEL: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.
2002
Istituto di Ricerca sulla Crescita Economica Sostenibile - IRCrES
Imprese pubbliche
Vincolo di Bilancio
Discrez. manageriali
Inv. e cash flow
Mercati dei capitali
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14243/40209
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