While the concepts of ignorance and doubt occupy central roles in epistemology as well as in philosophy generally, there have been surprisingly few attempts to give detailed analyses of these notions. We start out by identifying their main conceptual ingredients. We then propose a semi-formal account within the possible worlds framework of epistemic and doxastic logic. The upshot is that while ignorance can be construed as the absence of knowledge of any of the alternatives under scrutiny, doubt is a very special kind of ignorance. We develop two specific proposals for how to capture special features of doubt in our framework. One centers on the notion that doubt, as opposed to ignorance, requires maximum plausibility of opposing alternatives. The other is based on the assumption that, for an agent to doubt a proposition, she must entertain the question whether that proposition is true on her research agenda.
Explicating Ignorance and Doubt: A Possible Worlds Approach
Carlo Proietti;
2016
Abstract
While the concepts of ignorance and doubt occupy central roles in epistemology as well as in philosophy generally, there have been surprisingly few attempts to give detailed analyses of these notions. We start out by identifying their main conceptual ingredients. We then propose a semi-formal account within the possible worlds framework of epistemic and doxastic logic. The upshot is that while ignorance can be construed as the absence of knowledge of any of the alternatives under scrutiny, doubt is a very special kind of ignorance. We develop two specific proposals for how to capture special features of doubt in our framework. One centers on the notion that doubt, as opposed to ignorance, requires maximum plausibility of opposing alternatives. The other is based on the assumption that, for an agent to doubt a proposition, she must entertain the question whether that proposition is true on her research agenda.| Campo DC | Valore | Lingua |
|---|---|---|
| dc.authority.orgunit | Istituto di linguistica computazionale "Antonio Zampolli" - ILC | - |
| dc.authority.people | Carlo Proietti | it |
| dc.authority.people | Erik J Olsson | it |
| dc.collection.id.s | 8c50ea44-be95-498f-946e-7bb5bd666b7c | * |
| dc.collection.name | 02.01 Contributo in volume (Capitolo o Saggio) | * |
| dc.contributor.appartenenza | Istituto di linguistica computazionale "Antonio Zampolli" - ILC | * |
| dc.contributor.appartenenza.mi | 918 | * |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024/02/21 09:43:14 | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024/02/21 09:43:14 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
| dc.description.abstracteng | While the concepts of ignorance and doubt occupy central roles in epistemology as well as in philosophy generally, there have been surprisingly few attempts to give detailed analyses of these notions. We start out by identifying their main conceptual ingredients. We then propose a semi-formal account within the possible worlds framework of epistemic and doxastic logic. The upshot is that while ignorance can be construed as the absence of knowledge of any of the alternatives under scrutiny, doubt is a very special kind of ignorance. We develop two specific proposals for how to capture special features of doubt in our framework. One centers on the notion that doubt, as opposed to ignorance, requires maximum plausibility of opposing alternatives. The other is based on the assumption that, for an agent to doubt a proposition, she must entertain the question whether that proposition is true on her research agenda. | - |
| dc.description.affiliations | Lund University | - |
| dc.description.allpeople | Carlo Proietti;Erik J. Olsson | - |
| dc.description.allpeopleoriginal | Carlo Proietti and Erik J. Olsson | - |
| dc.description.fulltext | none | en |
| dc.description.numberofauthors | 1 | - |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 9780511820076 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85047564229 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14243/404027 | - |
| dc.language.iso | eng | - |
| dc.miur.last.status.update | 2025-01-22T15:48:46Z | * |
| dc.relation.alleditors | Peels, Rik ; Blaauw, Martijn | - |
| dc.relation.firstpage | 81 | - |
| dc.relation.ispartofbook | The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance | - |
| dc.relation.lastpage | 95 | - |
| dc.relation.numberofpages | 14 | - |
| dc.subject.keywords | Doubt | - |
| dc.subject.keywords | Ignorance | - |
| dc.subject.keywords | Modal Logic | - |
| dc.subject.singlekeyword | Doubt | * |
| dc.subject.singlekeyword | Ignorance | * |
| dc.subject.singlekeyword | Modal Logic | * |
| dc.title | Explicating Ignorance and Doubt: A Possible Worlds Approach | en |
| dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart | - |
| dc.type.full | 02 Contributo in Volume::02.01 Contributo in volume (Capitolo o Saggio) | it |
| dc.type.miur | 268 | - |
| dc.type.referee | Sì, ma tipo non specificato | - |
| dc.ugov.descaux1 | 429556 | - |
| iris.orcid.lastModifiedDate | 2026/05/19 12:38:59 | * |
| iris.orcid.lastModifiedMillisecond | 1779187139916 | * |
| iris.scopus.extIssued | 2016 | - |
| iris.scopus.extTitle | Explicating ignorance and doubt: A possible worlds approach | - |
| iris.scopus.ideLinkStatusDate | 2024/06/22 23:33:41 | * |
| iris.scopus.ideLinkStatusMillisecond | 1719092021644 | * |
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| scopus.category | 1200 | * |
| scopus.contributor.affiliation | - | |
| scopus.contributor.affiliation | - | |
| scopus.contributor.afid | - | |
| scopus.contributor.afid | - | |
| scopus.contributor.auid | 59803765000 | - |
| scopus.contributor.auid | 35148455900 | - |
| scopus.contributor.country | - | |
| scopus.contributor.country | - | |
| scopus.contributor.dptid | - | |
| scopus.contributor.dptid | - | |
| scopus.contributor.name | Erik J. | - |
| scopus.contributor.name | Carlo | - |
| scopus.contributor.subaffiliation | - | |
| scopus.contributor.subaffiliation | - | |
| scopus.contributor.surname | Olsson | - |
| scopus.contributor.surname | Proietti | - |
| scopus.date.issued | 2016 | * |
| scopus.description.abstracteng | I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself as without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses, and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (I) Introduction The concepts of doubt and ignorance are notions that we could not easily do without, in ordinary life or in science. We express doubt in someone's report if we consider the proposition expressed improbable or find the reporter lacking in credibility. If asked about some matter of fact, we express ignorance to signify that we don't know that answer, implying that the inquirer needs to consult another source of information. A reference to our ignorance may make our otherwise blameworthy action morally excusable. In inquiry, doubt is probably the driving force, philosophical inquiry being no exception. Famously, Descartes (1647) made methodological doubt the cornerstone of his rationalism. Empiricists such as Locke (1690) or Hume (1739–40) relied on a notion of comparative doubtfulness, seeing less reason to doubt the verdict of the senses than, say, that of imagination. (Neo-)Kantians and Wittgensteinians agree that the possibilities for doubt are more restricted than traditionally assumed, arguing that for something to be in doubt other things must be taken for granted (Wittgenstein 1969). Pragmatists like Peirce (1958) highlighted the distinction between paper and living doubt, maintaining that the latter is what motivates inquiry. For fallibilists, including Popper, doubt in empirical propositions is recognized as a fact of life that can never be completely relieved. Concerning ignorance, it is obviously the end point of many skeptical inquiries (e.g., Unger 1975). In spite of their fundamental conceptual roles, doubt and ignorance have been accorded relatively little interest by formal epistemologists. Thus, in comparison with the effort devoted to knowledge and belief since Hintikka (1962), the former concepts have received only sporadic attention in epistemic and doxastic logic. Similarly, mainstream epistemologists have invested comparatively little energy in clarifying the nature of, and relation between, doubt and ignorance. They focused primarily on analyzing knowledge, justified belief and related concepts. | * |
| scopus.description.allpeopleoriginal | Olsson E.J.; Proietti C. | * |
| scopus.differences | scopus.publisher.name | * |
| scopus.differences | scopus.identifier.isbn | * |
| scopus.differences | scopus.description.allpeopleoriginal | * |
| scopus.differences | scopus.identifier.doi | * |
| scopus.differences | scopus.description.abstracteng | * |
| scopus.document.type | ch | * |
| scopus.document.types | ch | * |
| scopus.identifier.doi | 10.1017/9780511820076.005 | * |
| scopus.identifier.isbn | 9781107175600 | * |
| scopus.identifier.pui | 622345966 | * |
| scopus.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85047564229 | * |
| scopus.journal.sourceid | 21100861857 | * |
| scopus.language.iso | eng | * |
| scopus.publisher.name | Cambridge University Press | * |
| scopus.relation.firstpage | 81 | * |
| scopus.relation.lastpage | 95 | * |
| scopus.title | Explicating ignorance and doubt: A possible worlds approach | * |
| scopus.titleeng | Explicating ignorance and doubt: A possible worlds approach | * |
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