In previous work, we have studied some non-interference properties for information flow analysis in computer systems on classic (possibilistic) labeled transition systems. In this paper, some of these properties, notably BNDC, are reformulated in a real-time setting. This is done by first enhancing the Security Process Algebra with some extra constructs to model real-time systems (in a discrete time setting), and then by studying the natural extension of these properties in this enriched setting. We prove essentially the same results known for the untimed case: ordering relation among properties, compositionality aspects, partial model checking techniques. Finally, we illustrate the approach through two case studies, where in both cases the untimed specification is secure, while the timed specification may show up interesting timing covert channels.
Real Time Information Flow Analysis
Martinelli F
2003
Abstract
In previous work, we have studied some non-interference properties for information flow analysis in computer systems on classic (possibilistic) labeled transition systems. In this paper, some of these properties, notably BNDC, are reformulated in a real-time setting. This is done by first enhancing the Security Process Algebra with some extra constructs to model real-time systems (in a discrete time setting), and then by studying the natural extension of these properties in this enriched setting. We prove essentially the same results known for the untimed case: ordering relation among properties, compositionality aspects, partial model checking techniques. Finally, we illustrate the approach through two case studies, where in both cases the untimed specification is secure, while the timed specification may show up interesting timing covert channels.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
