Supply security in the European natural gas pipeline network

Energy security of natural gas supplies in Europe is becoming a key concern. As demand increases, infrastructure development focuses on extending the capacity of the pipeline system. While conventional approaches focus mainly on source dependence, we argue for a network perspective to also consider risks associated with transit countries, by borrowing methods from ecological food web analysis. We develop methods to estimate the exposure and dominance of each country, by using network datasets from the present pipeline system, and future scenarios of 2020 and 2030. We have found that future scenarios will not increase the robustness of the system. Pipeline development to 2030 will shift the relative weight of energy security concerns away from source to transit countries. The dominance of politically unstable countries will increase. The exposure will be slightly redistributed by improving the security of already secure countries, and increasing the exposure of those countries that are already in a vulnerable position. Introduction During the first days of 2009 a dispute between Russia and Ukraine led to a closure of major gas pipelines, and the worst dropout of the natural gas supply in Europe so far (Pirani et al., 2009). Supply to 18 countries was disrupted, and some areas with limited reserves and a lack of alternative supply channels were left without heating amidst a bone-chilling cold snap. Initial cuts affected the supplies to Ukrainian consumption (January 1), while deliveries to Europe were reduced drastically on January 6 (e.g. Italy experienced losses of 25% towards its needs and decided to increase imports from Libya, Norway, and The Netherlands; Hungarian consumption was cut off by 40%).