Testing equivalence is a powerful means for expressing the security properties of cryptographic protocols, but its formal verification is a difficult task because of the quantification over contexts on which it is based. Previous articles have provided insights into using theorem-proving for the verification of testing equivalence of spi calculus specifications. This article addresses the same verification problem, but uses a state exploration approach. The verification technique is based on the definition of an environment-sensitive, labeled transition system representing a spi calculus specification. Trace equivalence defined on such a transition system coincides with testing equivalence. Symbolic techniques are used to keep the set of traces finite. If a difference in the traces of two spi descriptions (typically a specification and the corresponding implementation of a protocol) is found, it can be used to automatically build the spi calculus description of an intruder process that can exploit the difference.

Automatic Testing Equivalence Verification of Spi-calculus Specifications

L Durante;R Sisto;A Valenzano
2003

Abstract

Testing equivalence is a powerful means for expressing the security properties of cryptographic protocols, but its formal verification is a difficult task because of the quantification over contexts on which it is based. Previous articles have provided insights into using theorem-proving for the verification of testing equivalence of spi calculus specifications. This article addresses the same verification problem, but uses a state exploration approach. The verification technique is based on the definition of an environment-sensitive, labeled transition system representing a spi calculus specification. Trace equivalence defined on such a transition system coincides with testing equivalence. Symbolic techniques are used to keep the set of traces finite. If a difference in the traces of two spi descriptions (typically a specification and the corresponding implementation of a protocol) is found, it can be used to automatically build the spi calculus description of an intruder process that can exploit the difference.
2003
Istituto di Elettronica e di Ingegneria dell'Informazione e delle Telecomunicazioni - IEIIT
network security
Formal methods
Testing equivalence
Spi-calculus
Automatic analysis
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14243/49113
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