Time, Being and Language in Plato’s Timaeus

In this essay, I analyse Timaeus’ prescription at 37e3–38b3 on how to use some tensed and tenseless phrases, with particular regard to the verb “be”. I provide an interpretation of (i) what the meaning of the εἴδη (forms or aspects) of time is, and (ii) some epistemological and semantical implications of the tenseless use of “is”. Then, I connect this passage to two famous sections of Timaeus’ proemium, namely the distinction between being and becoming (28a1–4), and the statement that λόγοι are interpreters (ἐξηγῆται) and kin of (συγγενεῖς) what they speak about (29b2–c3). I show that the connection between the two parts of the dialogue is actually quite close and that they illuminate each other. My main interpretive proposal is that the relation between λόγοι and the temporal or atemporal status of their objects is so strict that not only does it affect their epistemic status but also their form.