Before any Possible Error: A Platonic Argument in Realism

Metaphysical Realism is commonly understood as the view that reality is independent of what one thinks or believes about it. To better understand the notion of independence deployed by metaphysical realists, I consider two very influential critiques from Putnam and Dummett. Thereafter, I show that Plato’s view on reality and the mind does not share the assumptions that are considered to be unacceptable by Putnam and Dummett. Thus, I go on to analyse a passage from the Cratylus that clearly shows (i) that Plato puts forward a view that we would uncontroversially consider as realist; and (ii) that in this view, the concept of error plays a pivotal role. Finally, I provide the outline of an alternative view on metaphysical realism, inspired by Plato’s line of thought, in terms of reality enjoying a priority over representation/belief.