Enabling imitation-based cooperation in dynamic social networks

The emergence of cooperation among self-interested agents has been a key concern of the multi-agent systems community for decades. With the increased importance of network-mediated interaction, researchers have shifted the attention to the impact of social networks and their dynamics in promoting or hindering cooperation, drawing various context-dependent conclusions. For example, some lines of research, theoretical and experimental, suggest the existence of a threshold effect in the ratio of timescales of network evolution, after which cooperation will emerge, whereas other lines dispute this, suggesting instead a Goldilocks zone. In this paper we provide an evolutionary game theory framework to understand coevolutionary processes from a bottom up perspective - in particular the emergence of a cooperator-core and defector-periphery - clarifying the impact of partner selection and imitation strategies in promoting cooperative behaviour, without assuming underlying communication or reputation mechanisms. In doing so we provide a unifying framework to study imitation-based cooperation in dynamic social networks and show that disputes in the literature can in fact coexist in so far as the results stem from different equally valid assumptions.