Images or Being? A Non-representationalist reading of true logoi in Plato’s Sophist

In this paper I address a very precise question emerging from Plato’s Sophist: what is the relation between the nature of images and the way declarative statements function? The scholarship has either moved from the assumption that both true and false statements are images of different types or asserted that this assumption is not convincing. I will give a twofold argument. Firstly, I will provide a novel account of the pros and cons of associating images and statements, concluding that for Plato if statements are false, they are images, whereas if true, they are not images. Secondly, I will discuss whether true statements are non-imagistic representations and argue that there is room for thinking that Plato has a very peculiar theory of truth such that true statements do not just represent reality or being, but rather they make being manifest to the thinking soul.