The trend of Neuromania (roughly, the brain tells us who we are) has its roots in the 19th-century phrenological approach developed by F.J. Gall and J.G. Spurzheim. Their initial intentions were embraced, a century and a half later, by some proponents of first-generation cognitive science. J.A. Fodor’s modular theory of mind and localization of different brain functions reflects Gall’s idea of a close “brain-mind(-body)” correlation, determining moral sentiments and intellectual faculties. Then as now, such a perspective inevitably leads to several risks: 1) an extreme scientificalization of domains outside scientific calculations (e.g., that of feelings and perceptions); 2) the hierarchization between more or less functional faculties which human beings would possess (deviating, e.g., into the legal sphere); 3) the possibility of detecting all this by studying the brain alone. So, the 19th-century phrenological quarrel both anticipated and clarified today’s contention. Concerning the anti-phrenological side, G.F.W. Hegel’s embodied approach and C. Cattaneo’s concept of association of ideas derived from perception (i.e., cognitive semiotic ante litteram), provide a key to addressing the above issues and proposing remedies to neuromaniac deviations in their various forms.
Brain versus body? Phrenological neuromania yesterday and today
Alice Orrù
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2026
Abstract
The trend of Neuromania (roughly, the brain tells us who we are) has its roots in the 19th-century phrenological approach developed by F.J. Gall and J.G. Spurzheim. Their initial intentions were embraced, a century and a half later, by some proponents of first-generation cognitive science. J.A. Fodor’s modular theory of mind and localization of different brain functions reflects Gall’s idea of a close “brain-mind(-body)” correlation, determining moral sentiments and intellectual faculties. Then as now, such a perspective inevitably leads to several risks: 1) an extreme scientificalization of domains outside scientific calculations (e.g., that of feelings and perceptions); 2) the hierarchization between more or less functional faculties which human beings would possess (deviating, e.g., into the legal sphere); 3) the possibility of detecting all this by studying the brain alone. So, the 19th-century phrenological quarrel both anticipated and clarified today’s contention. Concerning the anti-phrenological side, G.F.W. Hegel’s embodied approach and C. Cattaneo’s concept of association of ideas derived from perception (i.e., cognitive semiotic ante litteram), provide a key to addressing the above issues and proposing remedies to neuromaniac deviations in their various forms.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
