In the article, the author analyzes Descartes’ treatment of indignation in Les passions de l’âme. He puts forth his analysis in light of the diachronic history of the notion of indignation, and in particular of the co-existence of two notions related to this feeling: Aristotle’s nemesis and the Latin indignatio. While Descartes subscribes to a view of indignation that is in continuity with indignatio, thus associating this passion to hatred and anger, he also retains some elements from nemesis, namely its proximity with pity and envy. Furthermore, he redefines envy―one of the passions which indignation is historically related to― based on the definition of nemesis. The article explores this tangled reconfiguration, seeking the gist of Descartes’ position on indignation. Section one provides some general introductory elements on the history of this passion before Descartes, particularly in the sixteenth century. Section two provides a few fundamental remarks about what the author calls “judgmental passions”, a category that includes indignation along with pity, envy, and other similar passions connected to it. In section three, the author analyzes Descartes’ twofold definition of indignation in art. 65 and art. 195 of Les passions de l’âme. Due to the structural kinship between indignation, anger, and envy, in sections four and five he engages respectively with Descartes’ treatment of anger and envy. The focus is specifically on the aspects of these passions that help define Cartesian indignation, as well as on the emerging relationship between indignation and generosity. The sixth and final section proffers some conclusions and remarks about indignation in Descartes’ Passions
Descartes on Indignation, Envy, and Anger
Guidi, SImone
2026
Abstract
In the article, the author analyzes Descartes’ treatment of indignation in Les passions de l’âme. He puts forth his analysis in light of the diachronic history of the notion of indignation, and in particular of the co-existence of two notions related to this feeling: Aristotle’s nemesis and the Latin indignatio. While Descartes subscribes to a view of indignation that is in continuity with indignatio, thus associating this passion to hatred and anger, he also retains some elements from nemesis, namely its proximity with pity and envy. Furthermore, he redefines envy―one of the passions which indignation is historically related to― based on the definition of nemesis. The article explores this tangled reconfiguration, seeking the gist of Descartes’ position on indignation. Section one provides some general introductory elements on the history of this passion before Descartes, particularly in the sixteenth century. Section two provides a few fundamental remarks about what the author calls “judgmental passions”, a category that includes indignation along with pity, envy, and other similar passions connected to it. In section three, the author analyzes Descartes’ twofold definition of indignation in art. 65 and art. 195 of Les passions de l’âme. Due to the structural kinship between indignation, anger, and envy, in sections four and five he engages respectively with Descartes’ treatment of anger and envy. The focus is specifically on the aspects of these passions that help define Cartesian indignation, as well as on the emerging relationship between indignation and generosity. The sixth and final section proffers some conclusions and remarks about indignation in Descartes’ PassionsI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
