A real-time process algebra, enhanced with specific constructs for handling cryptographic primitives, is proposed to model cryptographic protocols in a simple way.We show that some security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, can be re-formulated in this timed setting. Moreover, we show that they can be seen as suitable instances of a general information flow-like scheme, called tGN DC, parametric w.r.t. the observational semantics of interest.We show that, when considering timed trace semantics, there exists a most powerful hostile environment (or enemy) that can try to compromise the protocol. Moreover, we hint some compositionality results.
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
Martinelli F
2003
Abstract
A real-time process algebra, enhanced with specific constructs for handling cryptographic primitives, is proposed to model cryptographic protocols in a simple way.We show that some security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, can be re-formulated in this timed setting. Moreover, we show that they can be seen as suitable instances of a general information flow-like scheme, called tGN DC, parametric w.r.t. the observational semantics of interest.We show that, when considering timed trace semantics, there exists a most powerful hostile environment (or enemy) that can try to compromise the protocol. Moreover, we hint some compositionality results.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
