Starting from our common life experiences - behaviours, that are normally backed up by mental processes which, in turn, are based upon more or less justified beliefs - I will show how our epistemological access to the world can lead us to wrong inferences which could leave us prisoners in a room (sections 1 and 2).A brief, somehow historical, survey of conceptual theories lays the basis to better understand how a recent cognitive theory (Theory-Theory) has lead to parallels between the reasoning we make in our everyday life and those that have to do with science. With regards to this, I will give an example taken from a diagnosis in dermatology (section 3). This example is also shown in a 'version' implemented at the computer, leaving a question behind (and open): quite often, when interviewed, why do not doctors make their reasoning clear, when that type of 'reasoning' can be considered so clear to allow the setting up of a real algorithm implemented on neural networks? (section 4). The conclusion, far from giving one (or more) answer/s, just wants to warn against possible reductionist or/and functionalist temptations (section 5).
Behavior, mental processes and theories: prisoners in the room of our beliefs (and our computations)
Luciano Celi
2006
Abstract
Starting from our common life experiences - behaviours, that are normally backed up by mental processes which, in turn, are based upon more or less justified beliefs - I will show how our epistemological access to the world can lead us to wrong inferences which could leave us prisoners in a room (sections 1 and 2).A brief, somehow historical, survey of conceptual theories lays the basis to better understand how a recent cognitive theory (Theory-Theory) has lead to parallels between the reasoning we make in our everyday life and those that have to do with science. With regards to this, I will give an example taken from a diagnosis in dermatology (section 3). This example is also shown in a 'version' implemented at the computer, leaving a question behind (and open): quite often, when interviewed, why do not doctors make their reasoning clear, when that type of 'reasoning' can be considered so clear to allow the setting up of a real algorithm implemented on neural networks? (section 4). The conclusion, far from giving one (or more) answer/s, just wants to warn against possible reductionist or/and functionalist temptations (section 5).I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.