Coevolution is considered as an effective means to optimize the conditions for the survival of cooperation. In this work, we propose a coevolution rule between individuals' node weights and aspiration, and then explore how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We show that there is an optimistic amplitude of node weights that guarantees the survival of cooperation even when temptation to antisocial behavior is relatively large. An explanation is provided from a microscopic point of view by dividing nodes into four different types. What is interesting, our coevolution rule results in spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, where defectors with low weight become cooperators by imitating cooperators with high weight.

Aspiration-based coevolution of node weights promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Boccaletti S.;
2019

Abstract

Coevolution is considered as an effective means to optimize the conditions for the survival of cooperation. In this work, we propose a coevolution rule between individuals' node weights and aspiration, and then explore how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We show that there is an optimistic amplitude of node weights that guarantees the survival of cooperation even when temptation to antisocial behavior is relatively large. An explanation is provided from a microscopic point of view by dividing nodes into four different types. What is interesting, our coevolution rule results in spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, where defectors with low weight become cooperators by imitating cooperators with high weight.
2019
Istituto dei Sistemi Complessi - ISC
Coevolution
Cooperation
Cyclic dominance
Social dilemma
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Descrizione: Aspiration-based coevolution of node weights promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14243/404581
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