Evaluating the impact of injected mobility data on measuring data coverage in crowdsensing scenarios

A major weakness of Mobile CrowdSensing Platforms (MCS) is the willingness of users to participate, as this implies disclosing their private data (for example, concerning mobility) to the MCS platform. In the effort to enforce data privacy in the creation of mobility coverage maps using an MCS platform, recent work proposes the use of a spatially distributed approach that, however, is vulnerable to data injection attacks. In this contribution, we define and implement a progressive attacker model following a statistical approach. We propose a novel mitigation strategy based on unsupervised anomaly detection. Accessing the coverage performance with real-world mobility data indicates that the mean value of the attacker's profile determines the probability of being revealed. In particular, we are able to identify the attacker and filter out the data injected by the attackers with high precision.